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A DOCTRINE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF A ROAD DIVISION
TO ENCOURAGE A FALTERING GOVERNMENT

An abstract for a thesis presented to the Faculty of
the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1965

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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A ROAD Division To Encourage

A Faltering Government

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the United States Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

At the present time, there is no current doctrine in the United States Army for the employment of an infantry division to encourage a faltering government. The need for such a doctrine has become critical inasmuch as the United States has assumed the leadership of the Free World during and since the second world war. This need is recognized by the establishment of such a role for the ROAD division in FM 61-100, The Division.

The United States has various means to resolve most of the violent threats to the established political order. However, the manner of using these means is in a nascent stage of development. If these problems of political order are not resolved by political actions, then, by default, military action of some type will likely be required. Conventional, direct military action may produce quick results, but the permanence of these results is questionable. In 1956, the Soviet Union resolved its problem of political stability of the communist government in Hungary by the means of a Soviet army consisting of ten divisions committed

in a military offensive. This was a crude action that produced the immediate desired results, but considering the long range view it served to publicize permanently a communist failure. The use of less means used with more finesse or in an adroit manner could have produced the desired results without the stigma of a bully.

The United States has limited itself in its military means in order to enjoy the benefits of other pursuits. Thus limited in military means and in keeping with United States recognition of the right of national self-determination, the U. S. military commander must be more adroit in employment of his available strengths to reduce violence that threatens political stability. The difficulty of using finesse of this type was displayed in Lebanon on 15 July 1958. A United States marine battalion landing team conducted an amphibious assault on the beaches south of Beirut in the traditional military manner. The Lebanese Army commander did not know if the marines were attacking or helping his forces. The marine battalion commander was not sure who or where his enemy was. The next day the same marine battalion was going to fight its way through Beirut in the traditional manner to seize the dock areas. If the intervention of the American ambassador had not prevented this attack, the marine battalion would have fought the

Lebanese Army as well as the opposition forces. Thus instead of restoring order, the marine battalion would have added to the disorder. Conventional military doctrine may frequently be inappropriate in the encouragement of a faltering government; a more suitable doctrine is needed.

In order to evolve an appropriate doctrine, four historical examples of faltering governments which were encouraged by military forces of approximate division size were analyzed in this thesis. Each faltering government was studied to determine the causes which made it weak. Then the capabilities and methods of employment of the military forces committed to encourage these governments were analyzed for basis of a new doctrine. After the analysis of the historical examples was concluded, a study of political theory as it related to governmental stability was conducted. Government stability was found to be a function of the expectations of its citizen body. Failure of the government to meet these expectations could lead to governmental instability.

The capabilities of the current ROAD infantry division were then studied in comparison to the capabilities of the military forces used in the four historical examples previously studied. The ROAD division was found superior in firepower, communications, mobility, and integrity of

command. The roles in which the ROAD division may be employed were then studied. These roles were a show of force, truce enforcement, international police action, legal occupation, restoration of order, protection of personnel and property, and civic action.

The capabilities of the ROAD division and the causes of government instability were analyzed in light of the four historical examples, and a doctrine was evolved. This doctrine places the division commander and his staff in the front ranks of the conflict. The violent conflict is held in abeyance if possible while conflict of interests are negotiated at the conference table. Military action must support, not preclude or undermine, these negotiations. The military commanders must be willing to and capable of negotiating with political leaders. If military force is necessary, it must be applied in the precise amount at the proper place with a full awareness of the political implications involved. Military force may be likened to a poison drug which, when skilfully used at the proper time, may save instead of destroy.

The doctrine developed by this study should increase the capability of the ROAD division to encourage a faltering government. Where the Soviet Union used ten divisions and acquired a political stigma in stabilizing the

faltering communist government of Hungary, it is hoped that a division or less of United States forces, through use of this doctrine, can stabilize a faltering government while avoiding unfavorable Free World reaction.

It is realized that this doctrine is not the complete answer to this problem. This doctrine is not a substitute for leadership, knowledge, or will power, but it is a guidepost in a portion of military tactics and strategy heretofore largely non-existent.

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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INTRODUCTION

The problem under study is to evolve a doctrine for the employment of a ROAD infantry division as part of a joint operation for the encouragement of a faltering government in a cold war situation. This doctrine is developed for the use of a commander or a general staff officer of an infantry division prior to departure from the zone of the interior. The study is limited to the tactical employment of the division headquarters, brigade headquarters, and the maneuver battalions of the infantry division. Other elements of the division are considered when they have a direct effect on the doctrine under development. The use of this doctrine offers guidance to the division commander and his staff in determining the specific objectives to be accomplished, the capabilities of the division to be considered, and the method of tactical employment of his subordinate units.

The study is centered between two sciences, the military and the political. As in all sciences, there are no firm distinguishing boundaries, no total independence.

There is a significant overlap between the military and political sciences, and it is on this overlapping area that the majority of attention is focused.

In years past the division commander has usually had a military strategy or the tactical plans of a higher headquarters on which to base his tactical plan. He has also had tactical doctrine to guide him in the accomplishment of his mission. Since World War II the division commander has found more of his missions shifting from military goals toward political goals; his established military doctrine is close to void concerning these situations. The division role of encouraging a faltering government does not provide a neat complement to the primary mission of destroying the military power of a government. On the contrary, they conflict and contradict one another. Thus, the military and political capabilities of the ROAD infantry division must be considered in a new light in order to determine how the division can accomplish its political mission of adding stability to a faltering government.

The purpose of developing this doctrine is threefold. First, the doctrine is designed to add to established military doctrine and further our national and international security. Second, it is a beginning for evolving the tactical concepts that are needed to fill the overlapping area

between the political and the military sciences; perhaps it will evoke more extensive thought in this area of the military art. Finally, it is intended to exploit the capabilities of the ROAD infantry division to give the division more versatility as a tactical unit in situations short of general war.

The approach to developing a doctrine for the encouragement of a faltering government begins with a study of four historical accounts of faltering governments that were assisted by military action of foreign governments. From each of these historical accounts are deduced the causes for the governments involved to falter and the method by which military action overcame these causes. In one case, that of Hungary, the reader may find somewhat unexpected and thought-provoking the examination made of the support the Soviet Union gave to the established communist government of Hungary in the 1956 rebellion. The capabilities of the ROAD division are then examined to determine the extent and the manner in which these capabilities can serve to subdue the causes of governmental instability. The significant facts of each part of the study are collated, and from these facts a doctrine is evolved. The doctrine is applied to a war game.

To further delineate the scope and to provide a

working basis for the study, the following assumptions are made:

1. The form of war is a cold war.
2. The faltering government has requested the assistance of the ROAD infantry division.
3. The ROAD division has a decided military strength over military or paramilitary forces threatening the faltering government.
4. The ROAD division is the agent of its own national government and does not represent any other government, national organization, or international organization.
5. The ROAD division will receive sufficient logistical and administrative support from higher authority. The capability limitations of the division combat service support units are the only logistical restraints considered in developing a course of action.
6. The ROAD division will receive the necessary air and naval support that may be required.
7. Characteristics of the area of operations:
 - a. Climate.--Temperate; temperature range from 0° to 100° F.; humidity and precipitation moderate.

- b. Landform.--Plateaus, mountains, and valleys.
- c. Vegetation.--Forests and farmlands on plateaus and in valleys; mountains barren above 3,000 feet sea level.
- d. Settlement.--Mostly towns and villages; only a few cities.
- e. Economy.--Basically agricultural; small family industries and simple handicraft; trade; limited modes of transportation and communications.
- f. Society.--Underdeveloped; population averages four years of formal education; average family income \$450 annually.
- g. Government.--Faltering oligarchy.
- h. Geographical Area.--Continental landmass.

When the developed doctrine is to be applied, the seven assumptions of this thesis should be reviewed. If the assumptions do not match the actual situation under study, the division commander and his staff must review the doctrine in light of the deviations and the necessary modifications of the doctrine.

PART I. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

CHAPTER I

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY OF 1948 TO 1958

Events Leading to the Emergency

The Malayan Emergency was the direct result of the efforts of the Malayan Communist party's directing and controlling the social forces in attempting to gain the dominant power in Malaya. In 1922 the Chinese Communist party started a new organization in Singapore. The Chinese population consisted of 40% of the five and a half million people living in Malaya. The Malays comprised over 50% of the population in Malaya. The Chinese of Malaya were not integrated into the Malayan community and the Malays refused to accept them socially or politically as equals. The Chinese had to educate their children with private and not public funds. As a result, the Chinese children were educated in the culture of China and gave their allegiance to China. The Chinese, by hard work and thrifty attitudes, became more prosperous as a group than the Malays. This economic difference increased tension between them. When Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalists broke from their communist

counterparts in 1927, the Chinese Communist party in Malaya reorganized itself as the Malayan Communist party and tried to recruit Malays. They had little success, and the Malayan Communist party was basically a Chinese organization in Malaya.¹

For eight years the Malayan Communist party remained a loosely organized group depending on individual initiative of low level leadership for success. Then in 1935 the party was reorganized. The Party Secretariat and the Central Committee still ran the party, but party organization under them was divided into three bureaus: the Racial Bureau to recruit Malays and Indians, the Propaganda and Education Bureau, and the Organizational Bureau. This reorganization produced middle-rank leadership and gave depth to the party. The party expanded its power through labor unions. The General Labor Union, its main arm in affecting the Malayan economic situation, staged many strikes in the coal and tin fields to raise the wages of the workers. The strikes were violent but generally failed to gain any benefits for the workers. The Communists managed to disturb the Malayan peace and order, but they paid for this disruption by the loss of key leaders. The alien Chinese, who were top union

¹Vernon Bartlett, Report from Malaya (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 33.

strike leaders, were banished from Malaya through means of a banishment ordinance. By 1940 the Communist party had expanded as far as it could under the current situation.²

The Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in August 1939, and the communist labor unions increased their strikes and harassment of the Malayan economic system. The Communists denounced the Allies for starting a capitalistic, imperialistic war and considered Nazi Germany their ally. When Germany attacked Russia, however, the Malayan Communists rapidly reversed their attitude and offered their support to the British Government. This offer was not fully accepted by the British. A few months later the Japanese invaded Malaya and secured it by February 1942. British authority was crushed.³

The Malayan Communist party was the only effective political force in Malaya after the Japanese conquest. The party organized the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to resist the Japanese occupation. The MPAJA later received material assistance in the form of small arms and ammunition from the British. The MPAJA was of questionable

²Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 59-61.

³Bartlett, p. 34.

military value to the Allies, but it kept the hopes of the Malaysians kindled for the eventual defeat of the Japanese. After the Japanese surrendered, it took the British a short period of time to accept the Japanese surrender in Malaya. The MPAJA took advantage of this time lapse to proclaim that they had defeated the Japanese, thereby gaining the respect and praise of the Malaysians.⁴

The end of World War II left Malaya in economic confusion and political disorder. The Malayan Communist party seized Japanese military equipment and hid it in the jungle along with the British equipment received during the war. There was a food shortage, and the currency was inflated to the point that it was worthless. The economy had collapsed. The Malayan Communist party moved into the political vacuum and set up "Peoples Courts" to punish Japanese collaborators and any other persons whom they saw fit to punish. Riots between the Malays and the Chinese broke out as a result of this type of communist justice, and only after considerable effort did the British regain control of Malaya.⁵

In the spring of 1948 the Malayan Communist party shifted its activity from labor agitation to open violence in order to achieve the goal of communism. The Communists

⁴Bartlett, p. 34.

⁵Pye, p. 71.

organized the Malayan People's Anti-British Army in the hope of exploiting their World War II MPAJA success. They also formed a "Blood and Steel Corps" comprised of communist thugs who enforced the discipline of the party and its auxiliary organizations. Three Chinese Kuomintang leaders were killed on 13 June 1948, and the next day ten more murders were made known. The British Government was generally aware of the communist build-up and expected a communist offensive might occur in Asia.⁶ On 16 June three planters were murdered in Perak, and the next day a state of emergency was declared in Perak and Johore. On 18 June a state of emergency was declared nationally.⁷

Causes for Governmental Instability

The Chinese immigrants who arrived in Malaya usually came under local Chinese auspices. This patronage often developed into secret clans or societies, associations that tended to maintain Chinese culture and customs in Malaya and prevented the fusion of the Chinese into the Malayan society. The Chinese in Malaya looked to China for their spiritual guidance and distrusted the Malayan Government, which

⁶Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 50.

⁷Pye, pp. 87-89.

was considered foreign.⁸

The Malays are a pleasure-loving and easy-going people. Their traits are in sharp contrast with those of the thrifty, very hard working Chinese. The Chinese immigration has given Malaya the highest proportion of Chinese population of any country except China. The Malays feared the possibility of the Chinese taking their country from them. This created another block in the path of a united Malayan community and a stable government.⁹

The defeat of the British Government by the Japanese Army in Malaya weakened the prestige of the British Government in the eyes of the Malaysans. The British ceased to exist as an effective military or political force in the minds of the Malaysans. The British Government in Malaya did not continue the battle from the jungle as the MPAJA had done. The Malayan resistance to Japanese occupation was led by the Malaysans and not by the British Government. At the end of the Japanese occupation, the MPAJA gained much prestige and respect from the Malaysans at the expense of the British Government.¹⁰

The rising aspirations of the Malaysans placed more

⁸Pye, pp. 52 & 201.

⁹Bartlett, p. 25.

¹⁰Bartlett, p. 34.

demands on the government for improvement in social welfare. Demands for better education, roads, and housing could not be met by the government of Malaya. Education, transportation, and good housing were luxury items to the average Malayan prior to World War II; but now they were necessities which apparently could not be obtained within the rule of the present government.

World War II had left the economic system of Malaya in a deteriorated state. The Japanese turned the resources of Malaya to their own use and left Malaya destitute. Critical food shortages and unemployment left the Malaysians quite receptive to communist doctrine. The Malayan Communist party was able to organize and control the labor movement in the country and to gain a strong foothold in the Malayan economic system.¹¹

The Communists took advantage of anti-colonial feelings that were prevalent throughout Asia. The Japanese occupation of Malaya gave the Malaysians a bitter taste of foreign domination. The Communists led the Malaysians to believe that they had defeated the Japanese in Malaya only to be reoccupied by the British government. The anti-British theme was a popular one in communist propaganda.¹²

¹¹Pye, p. 60.

¹²Pye, p. 231.

The Malayan Communist party, with its communist doctrine of violence and revolution, was the catalytic agent that focused the social turbulence against the British Government. The social problems of Malaya could have been solved by traditional methods over a period of time, but this would have excluded communism and colonialism would have continued. "The interpretation that communist doctrine gives to class relationships in the colonies and semi-colonies suggests that in these areas violence has a peculiar importance."¹³

The reasons for the instability of the British Colonial Government in Malaya can be summarized as follows:

1. The Chinese in Malaya maintaining loyalty to China and Chinese culture.
2. The Malays' sense of insecurity caused by the large scale immigration of Chinese and their economic success in Malaya.
3. The loss of British prestige by the Japanese conquest of Malaya in 1942.
4. The Malayan aspirations for increased social progress.
5. The economic slump of post-World War II.

¹³Pye, p. 27.

6. The development of an anti-colonial attitude in Malaya.
7. The Malayan Communist party and its doctrine of violence.

Military Action To Assist the
Government of Malaya

In 1949 the military arm of the Malayan Communist party reorganized to become the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The Communists realized they did not have the combat power to operate large military units in opposition to government forces. The MRLA decentralized their old brigades into twelve loosely controlled regiments. A "Military High Command" coordinated the twelve regiments and acted as the military headquarters for the Communist party. The regiments were assigned territorial areas of operation in Malaya and had independent platoons, the basic unit of the MRLA, operating within their areas. However, the platoons generally operated under direct control of their regional committee of the Malayan Communist party, with the regiments giving guidance only on broad policy matters.¹⁴

The Communists needed an organized civilian

¹⁴The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, Malaya: Headquarters Malaya Command, 1954), chap. II, p. 8.

population from which to draw support for the MRLA. The "Min Yuen" (people's movement) was organized, therefore, to provide supplies, personnel, information, and propaganda. It was controlled by the branch committees, lowest echelon of the Communist party. The "Min Yuen" had the task of building a stronger civilian allegiance to the communist cause and of furthering subversive activities.¹⁵

The Malayan Communist party planned their revolutionary campaign in three phases. The first phase included conducting guerrilla warfare from their jungle bases to weaken the government by attrition and building communist strength by the "Min Yuen." In the second phase the Communists attacked to seize outlying villages and increased their attacks on government installations. The last phase was the transfer of administrative control of communist occupied areas from the MRLA to the "Min Yuen" organization and the transformation of guerrilla units into regular army units. The advancements from the first through the third phase remained the basic policy of the Communists throughout the conflict. Periodic adjustments to this policy were only brought about by actions of government forces and by public

¹⁵Noll (pseud. of high ranking British Army Officer who served in Malaya), "The Emergency in Malaya," The Army Quarterly, LXVIII (April 1954), 47.

reaction of the Malaysans.¹⁶

The Malayan Government approach to the anti-terrorist campaign was expressed as follows:

The responsibility for conducting the campaign in Malaya rests with the Civil Government. The Police Force is Government's normal instrument for the maintenance of Civil Authority but, in the current Emergency, the Armed Forces have been called in to support the Civil Power in its task of seeking out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a Home Guard has been formed.¹⁷

The Army had the primary task of hunting and destroying the MRLA in their jungle base of operations. The Army had a secondary mission of assisting the police of the towns and cities in regulating curfews, food denial, and population control. The Army was deployed to support the civil authorities at each echelon of government.¹⁸

Headquarters Malaya Command worked in close coordination with the federal government. The High Commissioner of Malaya served as the Director of Operations and also functioned as Chairman, Director of Operations Committee. This committee, which supervised the overall military and political effort against the communist terrorists (CT),

¹⁶Anti-Terrorist Operations, chap. II, pp. 10-11.

¹⁷Anti-Terrorist Operations, chap. III, p. 1.

¹⁸K. R. Brazier-Creagh, "Malaya," The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, XCIX (May 1954), 182.

included the General Officer Commanding, the Commissioner of Police, the Director of Intelligence, and the Secretary for Defense.¹⁹

A State Settlement War Executive Committee (SWEC) was organized in each state to effect military and political coordination at that level. The SWEC consisted of the Menteri Besar (Prime Minister), the British advisor, the chief police officer, an army brigade commander, and the State Home Guard officer. The brigade headquarters was responsible to the SWEC for the military operations in the Malayan states.²⁰

Coordination between the military and the political institutions was further formalized by the organization of a District War Executive Committee (DWEC) at each civil district level. The DWEC consisted of the District Officer as chairman, the senior police officer, and an army battalion commander. The day-to-day operations and planning against the Communists were planned at this level. Coordination and cooperation continued at the lower level. The actions of the Officer Commanding Police District (OCPD) and the Army Company Commander were coordinated by close personal contact

¹⁹ Brazier-Creagh, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 181.

²⁰ Anti-Terrorist Operations, chap. III, p. 2.

and understanding. The infantry company was the basic unit of tactical operations. Platoons usually operated from a company base or camp.²¹

General Sir Gerald Templer, the High Commissioner, took the approach that in order to defeat the CT the government forces would have to win "the hearts and minds of the Malayan people" to the cause of freedom as opposed to communism.²²

A Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) was organized in August 1950 to aid the social progress of the Malayan people. This program aided the Malaysians in bringing good roads, housing, electricity, piped water, and other conveniences to the Malayan villages. Many old villages were burned down and new model villages were constructed. The Malaysians had to do most of the work themselves, but the RIDA gave them the guidance, materials needed, and construction equipment. The RIDA helped provide the social improvements that the rising aspirations of Malayan people were demanding.²³

A Director-General of Information Services was established at federal level to plan and execute continuous

²¹Anti-Terrorist Operations, chap. III, p. 9.

²²Pye, pp. 102-103.

²³Bartlett, pp. 54-58.

programs of information and propaganda for winning the minds of the Malaysians from the CT. The Information Services also carried the program for psychological warfare against the CT. At state and district levels, information officers had the task of fitting the overall information program to the local needs of their areas. All means of communication, from voice aircraft to pamphlets, were used in order to win "the hearts and minds of the Malayan people."²⁴

In June of 1950 Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations, formalized and put into effect a plan for the overall administrative control of the Malayan population. The plan was called the Briggs Plan²⁵ and its main objectives were as follows:

1. The resettlement of squatters.
2. The regrouping of local labor.
3. The recruitment and training of intelligence personnel.
4. The concentration by the Army on clearing priority areas and providing only minimum forces to support the police.
5. The coordination of the Army and the police

²⁴Noll, The Army Quarterly, 62-63.

²⁵Anti-Terrorist Operations, chap. III, p. 2-3.

functions.

The Briggs Plan provided a long term program for the unity of effort against the CT and started the task of isolating the MRLA from the Malayan population.

To reduce the effectiveness of the MRLA, the government instituted food control operations. Food shipments were not authorized except under government escort. All homes were searched and excess food was purchased. Food could only be purchased by civilians as was necessary to meet their immediate consumption needs. This operation was also a long term process in which the government had to wait for the CT to consume their stocks of food. Many spot checks and area searches were conducted, but the effort paid off as the tide turned against the CT.²⁶

The government conducted a program of resettlement to separate the CT from their supporting population. This program was initially started by Sir Henry Gurney, who was General Templer's predecessor as High Commissioner. Sir Henry was assassinated by the CT in October 1951, but General Templer continued the resettlement program. This program had another advantage beyond the isolation of the CT in that the movement of people with questionable loyalty to new

²⁶ Brazier-Creagh, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 183.

and better villages helped the government gain their loyalty and support. During the emergency, 550 villages were rebuilt at a cost of 11 million pounds. One-tenth of the Malayan population was relocated. The resettlement was accomplished with many political protests from Malaya to England, but the program greatly aided the defeat of the CT.²⁷

The Army in Malaya consisted of ten battalions of infantry in 1948. By January 1957 it had grown to 23 infantry battalions, 1 armored car regiment, and 2 armored car squadrons (see Table 1). To fix the CT, areas in Malaya were declared "Black" or "White" (see Figure 1). Emergency restrictions were placed on people in a "Black" area. When the CT were eliminated and the population became completely loyal to the government, the area was declared a "White" area and the emergency restrictions and controls were ended. This system encouraged the population to oppose the CT in order to lift the restrictions and aided the Army by reducing the CT area of operation.²⁸

The Army seized the initiative with the occupation of the "Black" areas. The battalions placed their companies

²⁷ Bartlett, pp. 49-54.

²⁸ Brazier-Creagh, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 185.


	Jun '48	Jan '49	Oct '50	Aug '51	Jun '52	Jan '53	Jun '54	Jan '55	Jan '56	Jan '57	Aug '57
Armoured Car Regiments	-	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Armoured Car Squadrons	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	2
Field Regiments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
Field Batteries	-	-	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2
HAA Batteries	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
Field Engineer Regiments	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	2	2
Infantry Battalions	10	15	19	19	21	23	22	22	23	23	21
Commando Brigade	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malayan Scouts	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-

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Table 1. STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY IN MALAYA, 1948 to 1957.¹

Source

¹Commander-in-Chief, Malaya Command. Unclassified Appendix 'B' to 'Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957', Sept 1957.

[illegible]

at strategic locations where company bases would be established. These company bases were located in the jungle to prevent civilian observation of their activities. Extensive patrolling was conducted from these bases by elements of the companies. Patrols were dispatched on combat missions based upon intelligence of CT activities. Patrols dispatched without any intelligence of CT activities usually were unsuccessful.²⁹ The military action in Malaya was primarily patrol action. Figure 2 reflects the military progress of the emergency. An incident is an act of violence initiated by the CT, and the CT incidents reached their peak in 1951. Contacts are attacks on the CT by the Army and the police, and the contacts reached their peak in 1950 and then leveled off until 1953.

By 1958 the emergency in Malaya had subsided. General Templer continued to work to achieve his three great ambitions for Malaya in the transfer of power from Great Britain. His first ambition was the peaceful transfer of power without bloodshed or violence. The second ambition was to accomplish the transfer without a decrease in governmental efficiency. His third ambition was to prevent the standard of living from decreasing during the transfer. He

²⁹ Brazier-Creagh, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 188.




Figure 2. Emergency Statistics in Malaya.

Source: Confidential Report, Malaya Command. Unpublished Appendix 'A' to "Review of the Emergency in Malaya from July 1949 to April 1957", Sept 1957.

felt that the remnants of the communist forces in the jungle would prove to be but a small threat to Malayan security if his three ambitions could be accomplished.³⁰

Conclusions

The Malayan people were faced with social problems of unemployment, inadequate housing facilities, poor communications, and insecurity. Government action was too modest to meet the rising aspirations of the Malaysans. With the violence caused by the MRLA and the initial success of the "Min Yuen" among the Malaysans, the government realized immediate and strong action was necessary; thus, the RIDA was established and it formed a link between the people and the government. The government was assisting the Malaysans in their aspiring for a better life with a strong and forceful program. The RIDA was a long range program. It took years for the government to reap its benefits, but the RIDA was a basic reason for the defeat of the MRLA.

The Information Services provided another effective tool for the government to secure the backing and support of the Malaysans. The government not only countered communist propaganda, but it was able to build up good relations between the government and the Malayan people. The

³⁰Pye, p. 363.

Information Services went on the offensive and was effective in weakening the CT will to resist. The innovation of voice aircraft brought increased efficiency for the means of communications to large remote areas. The lower level information officers provided flexibility for the information program by adjusting it to the varied local needs.

The isolation of the MRLA from its supporting population was accomplished by resettlement. This program was also a long range one that took years of time and effort before the CT felt its effectiveness. The resettlement not only hurt the terrorist support, but it helped the government win the loyalty of disaffected segments of Malaysians. The resettlement of Malaysians to better living areas and facilities increased their allegiance to the government of Malaya.

The government food control operation made it necessary for the CT to spend more time and effort collecting food and, thus, forced them to expose themselves to a greater extent. The CT were forced to cultivate patches in the jungle which marked their location through air observation. The food control program was a long range program, but in the final stages it was quite effective.

The organizing of a Home Guard provided the security that the Malaysians needed. Even the Chinese formed home

guards to provide security for their villages. The Home Guard enabled the Army to devote most of its attention to attacking the CT in his jungle home. The Home Guard also made the conflict their battle and not just the battle of the federal government. This helped link the government and the Malayan to a common cause.

The conduct of operations against the CT by executive committee systems worked very well. The unification of effort between the civil authorities and the military was mandatory at all levels. A pure military effort in the emergency would have been disastrous. A simple ambush patrol by a rifle platoon could have serious repercussions if the police did not clear the area of the friendly civilian population. The police attempts to enforce the food control operation, by road spot checks, would be fruitless if the CT could strike at will and seize food supply points. Coordination between the military and the civilian authorities must be formalized and vigorous at all echelons of authority.

The build-up of civilian and military intelligence nets is essential. The military operations cannot be effective if the location and activities of the enemy are unknown. If an army is to go on the offensive, it must know where the enemy is and in what strength. Building an intelligence net

is a long range program that must be accomplished if military operations are to succeed.

Geographically, the government had two key advantages. First, Malaya is surrounded by water on most of its borders. Thailand had the only common border with Malaya. Thailand cooperated with Malaya in securing the border from communist infiltration; thus, the CT received very little support from foreign sources and they were virtually isolated. Second, the CT were unable to control any areas outside of the Malayan jungle. The Army base of operations was relatively secure from communist attack since the Communists were forced to fight in small unit actions.

The government further restricted the communist actions by clearing areas of Malaya section by section. The use of "Black" and "White" areas further restricted communist operations and protected the government's rear area. The most significant difference between the "Black" and "White" areas was not the activities of the CT, but the loyalties of the population located in the area. If the people in the area were of pro-government loyalty, the CT could not function in that area.

The seizing of the initiative by the Army was of primary importance. The fact that the Army could and did leave the "White" areas and moved into the "Black" areas

turned the tide against the Communists. The Army not only moved into the "Black" areas, but they stayed and became as familiar with the jungle as the CT. Then the Army, as a regular force, could meet the communist irregulars with the advantages in its favor. The learning of jungle craft is a long term proposition, and a soldier cannot rotate annually and maintain jungle proficiency. The soldier can gain the status of a jungle expert only through knowledge and experience.

In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from the Malayan Emergency:

1. The loyalty of the population must be gained and maintained through social improvement, public information, and security.
2. The anti-government military arm must be isolated from foreign and domestic support. Resettlement is a method of achieving this isolation.
3. After isolation is accomplished, food control programs are effective in forcing the enemy to risk bold action.
4. A home guard will relieve an army of defensive tasks and bring the population closer to the government by sharing the responsibilities of defense.

5. Vigorous and formalized coordination committees between military and civil authorities facilitate operations.
6. The building of reliable intelligence systems is mandatory if the military is going to conduct successful offensive operations.
7. The securing of areas from the anti-government military forces must be followed by gaining the loyalty of the people in these areas.
8. The military must conduct offensive operations to destroy anti-government forces.
9. The military must be as familiar with the areas of operations as the anti-government forces.

Brigadier K. R. Brazier-Creagh, chief of staff in Malaya during the emergency, has summed up the military and political problem in Malaya as follows: "A cold war can not be won by shooting people or locking them up. Military action must restore law and order, but hand in hand with the military battle must proceed the search for, and the application of, an antidote to the cause."³¹

³¹Brazier-Creagh, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 186.

CHAPTER II

THE MAU MAU TERROR OF 1952 TO 1956

Events Leading To the Mau Mau Uprising

Mau Mau in its shortest terms was the violent manifestation of a limited nationalistic revolutionary movement confined almost entirely to the Kikuyu tribe. Although it assumed its atavistic form by intent, at a definite period in time, it was no sudden uprising; it was the culmination of a long period of political unrest among the Kikuyu people of Kenya, and was the evolutionary child of the first subversive Kikuyu political organization--the Kikuyu Association formed in 1920.¹

In 1920 the East African Protectorate of Kenya was officially raised to the status of a Crown Colony in the British Empire. In the same year a political party called the Young Kikuyu Association was organized to give the Kikuyu tribe political voice in internal affairs.²

The Kikuyu tribe, with a population of over one million Africans, is the largest of some eighty tribes in the Kenya Colony. Kenya has a population of 5-1/2 million

¹F. D. Corfield, Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960), p. 7.

²Fred Majdalany, State of Emergency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), p. 18.

Africans, 100,000 Asians, 30,000 Europeans, and 25,000 Arabs. The non-African population has lived in Kenya for three or four generations and Kenya is their homeland. Prior to colonialism, the Kikuyus were driven from the fertile plains by the Masai warriors into the forested area near Mount Kenya. The Kikuyus were an extremely superstitious, evasive, and unwarlike tribe.³

In 1922 Jomo Kenyatta joined the Young Kikuyu Association just in time to see it fall apart when its leader was jailed for leading a demonstration against a reduction in African wages. The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) replaced the old association and Kenyatta became one of its leaders. In 1928 Kenyatta became the general secretary of the KCA, and a year later he went to the Colonial Office in London to press for more freedom for the Kikuyu. The Colonial Office disliked his by-passing the Kenya Government and refused to receive his petition. From England he traveled through Europe and spent two months in Russia. Kenyatta joined the Communist party and, in 1930, he returned to Kenya for lack of funds.⁴

Kenyatta returned to England in 1931 to address a

³D. C. B. L. Esmonde-White, "Violence in Kenya," The Army Quarterly, LXVI (July 1953), 183.

⁴Majdalany, pp. 46-47.

committee studying the problem of Kikuyu ownership of land. He remained in England until after World War II. In 1940 the KCA was declared an illegal organization. The association continued to operate underground and collected funds for Jomo Kenyatta's return. In 1946 Kenyatta--educated, arrogant, and vain--returned to Kenya.⁵

In 1946 the Kenya African Union (KAU) was formed for the purpose of uniting the African people and fostering their interests. The members of the illegal KCA managed to gain control of the KAU and used it to obtain a legal status in Kenya. On 1 June 1947 Jomo Kenyatta was elected president of KAU. Kenyatta announced that African freedom could be attained only by bloodshed. Kenyatta consolidated his strength by imposing oaths of secrecy and loyalty on the KCA.⁶

From 1948 to 1950, Kenyatta expanded his control over the Africans of Kenya through organizations and secret oaths. The Director of Intelligence and Security in Kenya reported that there were at least 46 branches of the illegal KCA in operation, and further reported a new organization called the Mau Mau, which was believed to be part of the KCA. There was a growing awareness of an anti-European sentiment

⁵Majdalany, pp. 48 & 53.

⁶Corfield, p. 67.

developing among the people of Kenya; however, the Kenya Government refused to take official action or notice.⁷

The activities of the Mau Mau expanded. In April of 1950, two successful court prosecutions were brought against the Mau Mau organization. The Mau Mau was declared an illegal organization in August of 1950. Meanwhile, Kenyatta had turned the KAU into a Kikuyu extremist organization by excluding all elements of the moderate Africans from the Union. The KAU and the Mau Mau became virtually the same organization.⁸ Attempts were made to have Kenyatta denounce the Mau Mau during his KAU rallies, but he claimed ignorance of its existence and, therefore, could not denounce it.⁹

In early 1952 the Mau Mau started its campaign of open violence (see Figure 3). They began burning the huts of the Africans who refused to cooperate with them. There were 48 cases of burned huts in one month. The Mau Mau extended their violence to burning crops of European farmers. The Kenya Government began to show concern as Princess Elizabeth was going to spend her honeymoon at Treetop Hotel in Myeri, where the arson cases had occurred.¹⁰

Despite the intimidation and the forcing of secret

⁷Corfield, pp. 78-79.

⁸Corfield, pp. 268-269.

⁹Majdalany, p. 85.

¹⁰Majdalany, pp. 86-87.




Figure 1. Mau Mau-affected Area in Kenya.
(K.)

oaths by the Mau Mau, there was a considerable number of moderate African leaders and tribal chiefs who resisted the efforts of the Kikuyu extremists. These leaders fought the witchcraft of the Mau Mau with their own witchcraft. It was reported that the Mau Mau had become more drastic in their secret oaths by including the oath to murder Europeans when so directed.¹¹

In June of 1952, Governor Sir Philip Mitchell departed Kenya for retirement. The chief secretary headed the Kenya Government as acting governor and gave no indication of taking any more harsh action against the KAU and the Mau Mau than the past governor. The Kenya Government became a caretaker government and did not respond to the warnings of the impending terror.¹²

Mau Mau oathing teams were working at a fast pace. It was reported that oathing ceremonies, conducted during the night, recruited 800 new members for the Mau Mau. In September, 14 Kikuyus were murdered for failing to be loyal to the Mau Mau cause, By the end of September, 5 Europeans' farms had been set on fire and 146 cattle and 380 sheep had been either killed or maimed.¹³

¹¹Corfield, pp. 134-136.

¹²Madjalany, pp. 87-88.

¹³Madjalany, pp. 93-94.

Sir Evelyn Baring, the new governor of Kenya, arrived in Nairobi on 29 September 1952. He realized the seriousness of the Mau Mau situation and immediately visited the areas of violence. Near the end of his visits, he met with Senior Chief Waruhiu, a Kikuyu moderate leader who strongly opposed the Kikuyu extremists. After the senior chief left the meeting, he was ambushed in his car and murdered. The governor immediately returned to Nairobi and requested that a state of emergency be declared. The state of emergency was approved by the Colonial Office and became effective on 20 October 1952. Emergency powers were given for the arrest of Jomo Kenyatta and 82 other Mau Mau suspects. A British battalion in Egypt was alerted to depart for Kenya.¹⁴

Causes of Governmental Instability

The Mau Mau society has grown inside this superstitious, semi-educated, unwarlike tribe.

There are good Kikuyus and there are loyal Kikuyus but as a tribe they have a feeling of inferiority and they lack balance.¹⁵

The Kikuyu, who by 1948 numbered one million, are the largest tribe in East Africa. They are also the most receptive, quick-witted and adaptable.

They are deeply religious and excessively susceptible to superstition, witchcraft, animism, and magic.

¹⁴Madjalany, p. 95.

¹⁵Esmonde-White, The Army Quarterly, 184.

They have an exceedingly complicated language which only a tiny minority of Europeans has ever fully mastered. Much of their talk and idiom takes form of protracted parables. They are masters of the devious, seldom asking a direct question or giving a direct answer. Expertise in calculated double-talk, therefore, comes naturally to the Kikuyu who have acquired a western sophistication and fluency of thought. This makes them very difficult to negotiate with.¹⁶

The characteristics of the Kikuyu tribe were such that it was difficult for them to develop close ties or feelings with the British, Europeans, or, for that matter, with other African tribes. The Kikuyu tribe was secretive, suspicious, and clannish. Their social background helped mark them as social outcasts of the Kenya community.

When the Europeans settled in Kenya, they took the fertile land from the warlike Masai tribe and moved the Masai to the south. Forty years later, the Kikuyu, through their political voice, the KAU, declared that the Europeans settled on their stolen land from which the Masai previously had driven them. "The stolen lands" became the battle cry of the Kikuyu in their protest against British rule.¹⁷

Economics had left the Kikuyu in an undesirable position. Before the turn of the century, the Kikuyu could live off the land and the land could provide his needs. After World War II, Kenya started a transition from an

¹⁶ Majdalany, p. 29.

¹⁷ Corfield, pp. 10-11.

agrarian community toward a business community. The Kikuyu did not make the transition, but clung to his primitive way of life. He saw the Asian and the Europeans prosper while he stayed at the lowest economic level in Kenya.¹⁸

The African political leaders realized that if their people were to raise their status in Kenya, they would need better educational facilities. Despite the fact that the Kenya Government raised its educational budget from 157,000 pounds to 1,200,000 pounds in a seven-year period, the Kikuyus felt there was a great educational gap between the Africans and the non-Africans.¹⁹

Christianity helped split the ties that might have united the Kikuyu in the Kenya community. The Christian missionaries told the Kikuyu that their fighting was wrong, but they did not try to prevent the Europeans from fighting their great wars. The missionaries tried to prevent the practice of polygamy, as was the tribal custom, but nowhere in the Bible was this practice forbidden. The missionaries also tried to prevent festive tribal dances and cliteridec-tomy, part of the very core of Kikuyu custom and beliefs. The Kikuyu looked upon Christianity as the white man's means

¹⁸Majdalany, p. 22.

¹⁹Esmonde-White, The Army Quarterly, 184.

of suppressing them.²⁰

African nationalism, particularly in its racial form, provided the convenient vehicle for the Kikuyu to oppose the British authority. The Kikuyus represented less than one-fifth of the population of Kenya and they needed help from outside their tribe. Black Africans versus the white Europeans gave the Kikuyus a more favorable situation in overcoming the British. The KAU gave Kenyatta the organization to unite all Black Africans in his cause and gave him a legal organization as substitute for the illegal KCA. Kenyatta claimed to be the leader of African nationalism in Kenya, but, in fact, he was the leader of Kikuyu tribalism.

Jomo Kenyatta provided the spark to light the fire of Black African dissatisfaction with their position. He was educated by Christian missionaries in Kenya, the British in England, and the Communists in Russia. He understood the motivations and the philosophy of the Black Africans and he understood the white man's way. He was a very effective speaker and a demagog who set himself up as a god before his people, even encouraging them to sing hymns substituting Kenyatta for God and Jesus. He captured the hopes and aspirations of the majority of Black Africans.²¹

²⁰Majdalany, pp. 38-39.

²¹Majdalany, pp. 70-74.

The Colonial Government in Kenya was responsible for part of the Mau Mau terror. It continually ignored the rumblings of the growing unrest throughout the countryside and sent glowing reports of progress to the Colonial Office in London.

Nairobi was a remote and impersonal bastion of bureaucracy. One sent in reports and wondered if anyone read them. That this was so and that so many experienced officials felt that they were beating their heads against a wall showed how out of touch with the true situation [Governor] Mitchell was.²²

The Mau Mau terror can be attributed, in summary, to the following:

1. The Kikuyu tribal traits of introversion, superstition, and evasion.
2. The Kikuyu concept of "stolen land."
3. The economic status differential between Africans and Europeans.
4. The lack of educational facilities for Africans.
5. The Kikuyu belief that Christian missionaries were suppressing them for the benefit of the white man.
6. The rising tide of African nationalism.
7. The dynamic leadership of Jomo Kenyatta.
8. The passive attitude of the Kenya Government.

²²Majdalany, p. 97.

Military Action To Assist the
Government of Kenya

At 1930 on 20 October 1952, the first elements of the First Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers landed at Eastleigh Airport in Nairobi. These elements landed right after sundown so as to prevent public knowledge of the landing until the state of emergency was announced the next day. Before dawn the next morning, the police had arrested their 83 Mau Mau suspects, which included Kenyatta. The advance elements of the Lancashire Fusiliers conducted a flag march consisting of a company of soldiers attired in battle dress riding in lorries through the streets of Nairobi. It was a show of force.²³

The initial military force in Kenya included the First Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, the three battalions of King's African Rifles stationed in Kenya, and three more battalions of King's African Rifles brought in for the emergency. They were deployed and dispersed throughout the threatened areas to provide reinforcement for the police. The organizing of a Home Guard of loyal Kikuyu was started, and the woefully inadequate intelligence service was reorganized and strengthened. The strength of forces on hand required the government to maintain the defense

²³Majdalany, p. 104.

initially.²⁴

In the first two weeks of the emergency, the Mau Mau expanded their terror by murdering Senior Chief Nderi and the first European victim. During the third week of November 1952, the Mau Mau murdered Commander Meihlejohn, a retired naval officer, and Tom Mbotela, a past vice president of the KAU.²⁵ In January 1953 the Mau Mau surged ahead with a new campaign to murder Africans of the Home Guard and Europeans and to destroy their property. Many Africans and Europeans were murdered. These murders and the destruction of property caused the European settlers to demand firm government action and home rule. These demands were finally focused on a 27 January march of about 1,500 Europeans on the Government House in Nairobi to demand that the Governor take action to stop the Mau Mau. Action had been taken. Maj. Gen. W. R. N. Hinde had been given the responsibility for internal security, relieving the attorney general of that task.²⁶

On 26 March 1953 at 2130, approximately 1,000 Mau Mau attacked Lari, a village 25 miles northwest of Nairobi. The villagers consisted of many loyal Kikuyu and members of

²⁴Majdalany, p. 111.

²⁵Majdalany, pp. 107 & 113.

²⁶New York Times, 28 March 1953, p. 1.

the Kikuyu Home Guard. Because of its loyalty to the government, Lari was considered susceptible to attack and a company of the King's African Rifles was assigned to protect the village. Unfortunately, on the day of the Mau Mau attack, the company was reassigned to a mission south of Nairobi. The local Kikuyu Home Guard was also absent, patrolling a distant forest area. The Mau Mau murdered 84 Kikuyu villagers, destroyed over 200 huts and 1,000 cattle, and burned a five by seven mile area surrounding Lari. The fire could be seen miles away.²⁷

While the massacre at Lari was in process, a group of 80 Mau Mau carried out an attack on the Naivasha police station. They killed the four guards on duty. They released 173 prisoners from the detention camp. The Mau Mau broke into the armory and stole a large quantity of small arms and ammunition and then rapidly withdrew before the remainder of the awakened camp could react.²⁸

The massacre at Lari and the raid on the Naivasha police station marked the peak of the Mau Mau terror. General Sir George Erskine was assigned to the newly created position of Commander-in-Chief of East Africa, which meant

²⁷ New York Times, p. 1.

²⁸ Majdalany, pp. 142-145.

the military in Kenya would report directly to the War Office and not to Headquarters Middle East. Reinforcements in the arrival of the 39th Brigade increased General Erskine's forces to eleven battalions (see Figure 4).²⁹

The Mau Mau were organized generally into three main groups. The first was located in the forests at the base of Mount Kenya and was commanded by Waruhiu Itote, better known as General China. The second was located in the Aberdare forests on the east side of Aberdare Mountains; it was led by Dedan Kimathi, who gave himself the rank of field marshal. The third group operated underground in Nairobi and functioned under the Mau Mau Central Committee. This committee was located in Nairobi and loosely controlled the overall Mau Mau effort, which included many small bands of Mau Mau as well as the three main groups.³⁰

General Erskine developed a new strategy in which he would carry the conflict to the Mau Mau and would separate the Mau Mau from the population of Kenya. He started plans for withdrawing the Army units from defensive missions with the police. A cleared mile-wide strip was posted between the forests of Mount Kenya and Aberdare and the African

²⁹Majdalany, pp. 148 & 156.

³⁰Majdalany, pp. 158-159.




Figure 4. Military Forces in Kenya 1952 to 1955.

Reserve where the majority of the Kikuyus lived.³¹

General Erskine started carrying the fight to the Mau Mau. In the fourteen month period ending December 1954, 3,064 Mau Mau members were killed and over a thousand were captured. The Kikuyu Home Guard was over 20,000 strong, and the police had doubled their strength since the start of the emergency. The Mau Mau, during the same period, murdered 16 Europeans and 613 Africans. They wounded 5 Europeans and 349 Africans. The period of build-up had come to an end and the tide had turned.³²

The military intelligence organization was strengthened. Its primary task had been monitoring the police intelligence, but General Erskine separated the organization from the police intelligence. The military intelligence units had the new mission of seeking information from all sources for the specific needs of the military offensive. The security forces were fortunate in capturing General China during a minor conflict, and prolonged interrogation finally produced a complete Mau Mau order of battle in the Mount Kenya area. The intelligence units, through General

³¹George Erskine, "Kenya-Mau Mau," The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, CI (February 1956), 15-16.

³²Majdalany, pp. 188-189.

China, established negotiations for Mau Mau surrender that met with initial success but later broke down.³³

In pushing to the offensive, General Erskine conceived the plan of clearing Nairobi of Mau Mau supporters. This plan was called Operation ANVIL. A reception camp for 10,000 persons and a detention camp for 7,000 were built. Four British battalions and one African battalion reinforced the Nairobi police. On 24 April 1954, these forces surrounded Nairobi and sealed off each sector of the city. The police searched in each sector for all Africans and moved them to investigation centers. Those suspected of Mau Mau loyalties were moved to detention camps. At the end of two weeks, 16,538 of the 30,000 Africans screened were detained. The operation continued for another two weeks. Operation ANVIL smashed the Mau Mau organization in Nairobi.³⁴

General Erskine maintained this tight hold on Nairobi and started a policy of villagization. The Kikuyu tribe had been on small family homesteads spread over the African Reserve. To facilitate control, the Kikuyus were relocated into villages that could be protected. By the end of 1955, approximately 1,000,000 Kikuyus were resettled.

³³Majdalany, pp. 193-196.

³⁴Erskine, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 16.

The Mau Mau were further separated from their means of support when the farmers were required to keep animals in guarded areas and were prohibited from growing maize and beans, which the Mau Mau used for foodstuff.³⁵

A large sweep of the Aberdare forest, Operation HAMMER, was conducted in the beginning of 1955. General Hinde led the sweep, but it produced only 161 Mau Mau dead or captured. The thick forests provided too much cover for the operation to be effective. General Hinde requested permission to use different tactics in the forests near Mount Kenya. The new tactics involved each subordinate unit's controlling a portion of the forest. The units would live in their sector of the forest and use air attacks to flush out the Mau Mau. General Hinde's request was approved and the new operation was called Operation FIRST FLUTE. It lasted two months. The Mau Mau loss of men was not very high, 277 either killed or captured, but their loss of control in the forest proved to be their downfall.³⁶

Operation FIRST FLUTE was the last major military operation against the Mau Mau. A strength of 12,000 strong had fallen down to 2,000 by the end of 1955. The military

³⁵Majdalany, pp. 210-217.

³⁶Majdalany, pp. 212-214.

slowly turned its tasks over to the police and withdrew from Kenya. On 21 October 1956, Kimathi was captured after a long, hard man-hunt by the police. The emergency ceased to exist by the end of 1956, and the transition to normal life was hardly noticed by Kenya. The political accommodation of African nationalism was accomplished by the emergency.³⁷

Conclusions

The Mau Mau uprising started with the disadvantage of being confined to a 150 square mile area and was local in nature. Jomo Kenyatta had joined the Communist party, but there was no evidence that the Communists supported the Mau Mau with weapons and supplies. The Mau Mau had to steal, capture, or make their weapons. They were not able to receive external assistance in the form of men or materials. The Mau Mau drew their material support off the land where they operated. They commanded the loyalty of the Africans by fear of witchcraft, murder, and destruction. As long as the Mau Mau had the power to strike fear in an African's mind, they received the support of the majority of Africans.

The British initial action, after the state of emergency began, was to send a British battalion by air to Nairobi. The move was made under secrecy in the interest of

³⁷Majdalany, pp. 219-222.

political rather than military reasons. Elements of the British battalion made a flag march or show of force in Nairobi, the value of which was questionable. It may have lifted the morale of the Europeans in Nairobi, but it did not hinder the Mau Mau operations in the rural areas or in the city.

Gaining the support of the non-Mau Mau population was perhaps the biggest task of the Kenya Government. European farmers resented the restrictions placed on them, such as not growing beans and maize or locking up their cattle at night. It was mainly through personal persuasion of key government officials that the farmers supported the government policies.³⁸ The support of the African segment of the population started to rise as the power of the Kenya Government overcame the power of the Mau Mau to create fear in the Africans. The Mau Mau atrocities, such as the massacre at Lari, backfired on them. These atrocities against the Africans generated hatred instead of loyalty toward the Mau Mau cause. The action aided the government in recruiting the Kikuyu Home Guard and making it an effective organization against the Mau Mau.

Building an intelligence network against the Mau Mau

³⁸Majdalany, p. 217.

was a necessity. To gain contacts with Mau Mau operations, the government intelligence had to build an intelligence network of loyal, neutral, and converted Kikuyus. This network took years to build and failed to assist military operations initially. The intelligence system lacked personnel who could talk to the Kikuyus and understand their sense of values. It was only in 1955 that the intelligence system became an effective aid to military operations.

Perhaps the biggest change that General Erskine brought to Kenya in 1953 was a change of attitude, a change to offensive action by the military. Prior to General Erskine's arrival, the military forces reinforced the security police in the protection of the population against the Mau Mau. The military had developed a reaction or defensive type attitude that merely maintained the status quo. General Erskine developed the concept in which the security police and the Kikuyu Home Guard fixed the Mau Mau to their forest home and the military forces attacked the Mau Mau on their own ground. The change to the offensive was probably the main factor in the defeat of the Mau Mau.

In order to go on the offensive, General Erskine had to isolate and fix the Mau Mau forces. He isolated the Mau Mau from their Kikuyu source of supply by the villagization of the Kikuyus. He fixed the Mau Mau forces in their forest

haven by the construction of a no-man's land strip on the edge of their forest areas. With these projects well under way, General Erskine was ready for his first major offensive action.

The first major offensive action, Operation ANVIL was directed at securing the base of government operations, Nairobi. Mau Mau bands operating in Nairobi provided valuable intelligence and supplies for the Mau Mau forces; they were a thorn in the side of the Kenya Government as they operated in the shadow of the Government House. Operation ANVIL, in reaching its successful conclusion, not only cleared the government base of operations, but it broke up the Mau Mau headquarters that coordinated the overall Mau Mau effort.

The second major offensive action, Operation HAMMER, was conducted against the Mau Mau in the Aberdare forests. This operation was not a success as it was a one time sweep of the forest and the Mau Mau eluded the British forces in the thick cover. The Mau Mau still controlled the forests.

The third major offensive action, Operation FIRST FLUTE, was conducted against the Mau Mau in the forests of Mount Kenya. The government forces divided the forests into sectors, giving each subordinate unit a sector to control. The government forces lived in their assigned sectors and

became as familiar with the forests as the Mau Mau. The military forces controlled their areas, and in a two month period the Mau Mau ceased to be an effective force. General Erskine had practiced the principle of economy of force by conducting the offensives, one at a time, against the three main groups of isolated Mau Mau.

The Kenya Government maintained negotiations with the Mau Mau leaders, offering to spare their lives for their surrender. It is difficult to estimate the effect of the negotiations, but the Mau Mau interest in negotiations indicates a great effect on their will to fight. They did not have to fight with their backs to the wall; there was a way out.

In summary, the following significant points are concluded from the Mau Mau terror:

1. The flag march of the British, in Nairobi on 21 October 1952, had little effect on Mau Mau operations.
2. Gaining the support of the Kenya European and African population against the Mau Mau was a major effort of the government.
3. The lack of an initial effective intelligence organization hampered military operations.
4. The offensive action of the military forces was

essential to the defeat of the Mau Mau.

5. Isolating the Mau Mau from their supporting African population weakened their ability to fight as an effective force.
6. Fixing the Mau Mau to their forest or city haven made them vulnerable to offensive action.
7. The first major offensive of the military forces was to clear the Mau Mau from its base of operations in Nairobi.
8. The mobility advantage of the military forces enabled them to apply the principle of economy of force and to defeat the Mau Mau in detail.
9. The negotiations were held with the Mau Mau to give them an alternate other than death. This weakened the Mau Mau will to resist.

CHAPTER III

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956

Events Leading to the Hungarian Revolt

The Magyars were perhaps the most freedom loving people in Europe and probably had to fight as hard as any nation toward gaining this freedom. Dr. Hans Kohn has made the following observation:

Even more than the Croats, the Magyars were a people with a proud national past, the consciousness of which was kept alive throughout the centuries. The Turkish domination of the larger part of Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries prevented there the weakening of the power of the Estates which happened elsewhere in Europe under the impact of centralizing monarchist absolutisms. The Hungarian Estates, composed mostly of the Hungarian nobility, showed a spirit of independence and a ruthless will to defend their class and national position not found in other provinces of the Habsburg Empire. The feudalist nationalist spirit of the Hungarian nobility survived unbroken until 1918 and even until 1945.¹

As part of the Habsburg Empire, in April of 1849 the Hungarian Diet proclaimed Hungary an independent republic. The Hungarian Army, led by General Arthur von Gorgei,

¹Hans Kohn, The Habsburg Empire, 1804-1918 (Princeton, N. J.: D. Von Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961), p. 27.

successfully resisted the Austrian Army in its attempt to regain Hungary for the Habsburg Empire. Then, in August of 1849, the Russian Army invaded Hungary to assist the Austrian emperor. The Hungarian attempt for freedom was subdued by the Russian Army and this left its mark in the form of Hungarian hostility toward Russia.²

In 1866 Prussia and the Austrian Empire became involved in a war over who would control the states of the German Confederation. With the defeat of the Austrian Army on 3 July 1866 near Koniggratz in eastern Bohemia, the power of the Austrian Empire was greatly weakened. Realizing the support of Hungary was needed, Austria gave Hungary equal partnership by forming the Austro-Hungarian Empire with a dual monarchy. Francis Joseph became emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. He controlled the army and the foreign policy. The Magyars were given exclusive rule within Hungary.³

After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire at the end of World War I, Hungary was given its independence. Hungary maintained its independence until it became involved in World War II. Hungary was absorbed by Hitler's Third Reich and its armies fought alongside the German armies against

²Kohn, p. 35.

³Kohn, pp. 43-45.

Russia. It has been stated that the Hungarian Army fought enthusiastically against the Russians.⁴

In 1945 the Soviet forces occupied Hungary. The economic life of Hungary was destroyed by the ravages of war. The Hungarian Government ceased to function. The Soviet Army was the only effective authority in Hungary, and it ruled as it wished. The Soviet Union did not establish a communist government, although communist Hungarian exiles in Russia were returned to Hungary to rebuild the Communist party. Two leaders of this exile group were Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero. The Soviet Union did not show any favoritism to the Communist party initially. Other political parties were encouraged and assisted along with the Communist party.⁵

The Smallholders party was the largest political party organized and it had the support of over half the Hungarian population. The party leaders were middle class intellectuals with a liberal view. A Peasant Union was formed as an economic organization within the Smallholders party. This union increased the peasant strength in the

⁴Edgar O'Ballance, "Hungary," Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, XXCIII (October 1961), 61.

⁵Melvin J. Lasky, The Hungarian Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 15.

party. Ferenc Nagy was the leader of the Peasant Union.⁶

The Social Democratic party was a smaller but better established party. It was closely aligned with the Communist party but wanted to be separate from the Communists.⁷

The Nationalist Peasant party was a third party and found its strength in the intellectuals who studied the conditions of the peasants. They were socialists and revolutionaries, but not Marxists. The members of this party played an active part in the October 1956 revolution.⁸

These three parties, along with the Communist party, rebuilt the Hungarian State. The National Council was formed to act as a temporary parliament with representation from the four political parties. The National Council immediately enacted a sweeping land reform, the first land reform since 1919. Less than 1% of the landowners had held approximately 50% of the land until 4-1/2 million acres of arable land were distributed to 660,000 peasant families. Imre Nagy, a communist and the minister of agriculture, was instrumental in accomplishing the land reform and became popular because of its success.⁹

The first free parliamentary election in Hungary

⁶Lasky, p. 15.

⁷Lasky, pp. 15-16.

⁸Lasky, p. 16.

⁹Lasky, p. 16.

since World War II was held in October 1945. The Smallholders party won 57% of the votes, which constituted an absolute majority. The Social Democrats obtained 17% of the votes, as did the Communists, and 7% of the votes went to the National Peasant party. The vote was impressive as this was the only free election held in Soviet occupied Europe in which the electorate overwhelmingly rejected the Communist party in the presence of Soviet troops. Marshal Voroshilov, Soviet Army Commander, did not consent to the Smallholders party's controlling the government and required a coalition government; further, the key post of minister of interior was required to be held by a communist.¹⁰

In the period following the free election, the Soviet and communist objective became the destruction of the Smallholders party. The party members were harassed, intimidated, imprisoned, and branded as fascist reactionaries. After the Smallholders party was subdued, the Communists worked toward the fusion of the Social Democrats. By means of intrigue and terror, the Communists completed the fusion by June of 1948. Thus, the Hungarian Communist party established itself as a one-party totalitarian regime.¹¹

The break between Marshal Tito and Stalin took place

¹⁰Lasky, p. 17.

¹¹Lasky, pp. 17-18.

in the summer of 1948. The Kremlin began its campaign against national deviations within the communist bloc. The Communist party in Hungary was subject to this purge. Laszlo Rajik, a leading communist, was arrested and tried for maintaining contacts with Tito. After a publicized trial, Rajik was executed. Janos Kadar and Gyorgy Marosan, both political leaders in the communist and socialist camps, were caught in the purge and imprisoned. The Central Committee, the highest level of the Communist party, had a 50% turnover of personnel as a result of the purge.¹²

In 1949 the Communist party promulgated a new constitution giving all power to the workers of the cities and villages. This action formalized the sovietization of Hungary. In the same year the Communist party embarked on a five year plan for the industrialization of Hungary. Peasants were moved from the villages to industrial centers. This flux of people caused many hardships. Problems of housing, sanitation, food, and leadership caused general dissatisfaction among the new factory workers. Inefficiency, lack of coordination, and an increase in goals of the five year plan caused it to be a dismal failure in 1951.¹³

¹²Lasky, p. 18.

¹³Francois Fejto, Behind the Rape of Hungary (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 38-51.

The Communist party attempted to nationalize the agriculture of Hungary, but these attempts fell short of the communist goals. By the end of 1951 the Hungarian Government had pressured 4,653 farms into the collective system. Despite its all-out effort, the government admitted that up to 40% of the members were absent from the farms at the critical harvest time. Peasants slaughtered or sold their livestock before joining the collective farms. The collective farms did not match the level of production set by the farms of the free peasants. Agriculture in Hungary had reached a critical state by the summer of 1953.¹⁴

The Roman Catholic Church came into conflict with the communist regime, not only on theological grounds but also on secular grounds. The church in Hungary owned 348,000 acres of tillable land. After the land reform, the church retained only 80,000 acres. Cardinal Mindszenty, the Catholic leader in Hungary, protested strongly against the land reform as the church land enabled the high clergy to enjoy aristocratic standards of living and kept the church independent of the state. The conflict between church and state increased in 1948 with the nationalization of schools. Cardinal Mindszenty retaliated by excommunicating a

¹⁴Fejto, pp. 59-71.

pro-communist priest and ordering all priests employed as teachers to leave the secularized schools. The Communists reacted with the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of the cardinal.¹⁵

With the death of Stalin in 1953, the Kremlin control over the satellite nations was reduced. In July of that year, popular Imre Nagy became the premier of Hungary and put forth milder policies that reflected the new communist attitudes. The disbandment of collective farms was allowed, many political prisoners were released, and the pace of industrial development was reduced. Imre Nagy remained as premier for two years. He gave freedom to the intellectuals for public expression and study outside of Hungary. In April of 1955, Nagy was removed from office for not furthering collectivization of agriculture and for under-rating the importance of heavy industry.¹⁶

Andras Hegedus succeeded Imre Nagy as premier, and on 18 July 1955 Erno Gero, a Stalinist and subservient to Soviet policy, replaced Rakosi as first secretary of the Hungarian Communist party. The Communist party returned to its harsh policy of collectivism. The Hungarian people resented this return, and in mid-October of 1956 they were

¹⁵Fejto, pp. 71-78.

¹⁶Lasky, p. 21.

encouraged by the open resistance of the Polish people to the Kremlin's harsh policy.¹⁷

Since the death of Stalin, the Hungarian masses were drifting further away from the communist philosophy. The communist bureaucracy had lost contact with the masses. This loss of contact was partially reestablished by the intellectual element of the Hungarian society. This element expressed itself mainly through the Hungarian Writers' Union, which acted as an intermediary between the government and the people. The union was, in fact, a political party. The Hungarian writers spoke to and criticized the government as equals. Because of union backing by the Hungarian people, including many communist Hungarians, the government was virtually helpless to take action against the Writers' Union. The union filled the void between the masses and the government and became a state within a state.¹⁸

Deposits of uranium were discovered near Pecs in the fall of 1954. This discovery was kept a secret from the Hungarian people. Rakosi, for an extremely small compensation, agreed to give exclusive rights to the Soviets to exploit the deposits. The secret of the uranium discovery and of Rakosi's agreement became known to the people in the

¹⁷Lasky, p. 21.

¹⁸Fejto, pp. 118-119.

summer of 1956. The Hungarians were indignant as Hungary lacked cheap power and they felt that Hungary could have benefitted from these deposits as Belgium had from the uranium deposits in the Congo.¹⁹

The resentment of and pressures on the Hungarian people continued to build until they reached a peak on 23 October 1956. On that day the students in Budapest, along with other intellectuals, decided to demonstrate before the Petofi monument and then march to the Jozef Bem Square. They encouraged the populace to join them. The demonstration started in the afternoon and the ranks of the intellectuals were swollen with other citizens of Budapest. The demonstrators were estimated to be over a hundred thousand strong. The demonstration moved from Petofi monument to Jozef Bem Square. There Peter Veres, the president of the Writers' Union, recited the seven point demands of the Writers' Union: an independent national policy; reforms in industrial, agriculture, and political policies; and replacement of the Rakosi clique by Imre Nagy. After the Veres speech, the demonstrators moved to the parliament building and the radio station where Gero was to speak for the government. Gero announced that the Central Committee, instead

¹⁹Fejto, pp. 135-136.

of meeting immediately, would meet on 31 October to consider the demands. This action infuriated the crowd. The students demanded that the seven point demand be broadcast. The Avos, secret police, who were guarding the radio station opened fire on the demonstrators. This violence started the revolution.²⁰

On the evening of the 23d, the Hungarian Army was called upon to quell the demonstrations and the fighting between the Avos and the demonstrators; however, the troops joined the demonstrators. By 0700 the next morning, the insurgents had seized the radio station. Gero called an urgent meeting of the Central Committee to request Russian troops to restore order and to reshuffle the party leadership. The Central Committee appointed Imre Nagy as premier and asked the Soviet troops to intervene.²¹

Causes of Governmental Instability

The basic cause for instability of the communist government in Hungary was that it failed to be a government of Hungarian nationalism. The elections held in 1945 reflected that only 17% of the populace desired a communist government. The Hungarian people could have lived with the communist regime without rebelling if the Communists had

²⁰Fejto, pp. 177-183.

²¹Fejto, pp. 185-189.

been willing to continue to compromise with Hungarian nationalism as they did, in part, from 1945 to 1949. The sovietization of Hungary, which started in 1949, completed the separation of the Hungarian from his national values and freedom. The first demand of the Hungarian writers was as follows:

We want an independent national policy based on the principles of socialism. Our relations with all countries, and particularly with the USSR and the people's democracies, should be regulated on the basis of the principle of equality. We demand a review of treaties and economic agreements between States in the spirit of the equalities of rights for the nations involved.²²

Hungary's history of struggle for independence and equality had left its mark on Hungarian national values. The communist leaders, such as Rakosi, Gero, and Hegedus, suppressed these values in favor of Soviet domination.

The basic cause of instability of the communist government has its roots in economic, religious, and political problems. It is interesting to note that the Hungarians were still loyal to their government despite the harsh war payments the Hungarian Government of 1946 and 1947 had to extract from its people. When the five year plan of 1949 and the collectivization of farm lands were enforced, a shift of loyalty developed from the communist government

²²Lasky, p. 48.

toward the ideas of Hungarian nationalism.²³

Hungarian nationalism and the Roman Catholic Church went hand in hand. The Communists, in suppressing the church, further alienated the Hungarians from the government. The Hungarian Catholics could not forget the persecution and harassment of their church.²⁴

The political reasons for the unstable condition of the communist government can be divided into internal and foreign affairs. Internal dissention started with the Communist party suppression of other political parties in 1947 and 1948. By the end of 1948, Hungary had only one party, the Communist party. The purge of the Communist party by the Kremlin for national deviation and the trial of Laszlo Rajik for treason reminded Hungary that it was not a free nation. The two years of a milder communist policy under Premier Nagy, 1953 to 1955, gave Hungary a breath of fresh air, but in 1955 Hungary returned to Soviet subservience under Premier Hegedus. The foreign domination of Hungary's internal affairs through its communist government helped cause political criticism to erupt into physical violence.²⁵

Events in foreign affairs that aided the instability

²³Fejto, p. 50.

²⁴Fejto, p. 77.

²⁵Lasky, p. 21.

of the communist government in Hungary were the breach between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1948 and the Polish riots in October of 1956. Both events showed the Hungarians that the Soviet Union was not the complete master in the communist camp. As the Soviets had to adjust to demands of the Yugoslavs and the Poles, the Hungarians hoped the Soviets would adjust to their demands. This gave added hope to the success of their rebellion.

The following political situations summarize causes of the Hungarian revolt of 1956:

1. The strong feeling of nationalism which existed in the Hungarians, focusing upon their common past in the revolution of 1848.²⁶
2. The domination of internal political affairs by the communist oligarchy controlled by Moscow.
3. The persecution of the Roman Catholic Church.
4. The economic oppression of the five year plan and the farm cooperatives.
5. The defiance of Yugoslavia and Poland against Soviet authority.
6. The secret uranium agreement with Russia.
7. The public hatred of the Avos, the secret police.

²⁶Lasky, p. 41.

These causes finally broke the political control of the Communist party over the Hungarians and required the Soviet Army to reestablish communist control over Hungary.


Military Action To Assist the Government

When the Hungarian Central Committee requested intervention by Soviet troops, the Soviet Union had two mechanized infantry divisions stationed in Hungary, the 2d at Cegled and the 17th at Szekesfehervar; two mechanized infantry divisions, the 32d and the 34th, that were immediately available in western Rumania; and two more mechanized divisions available in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, near the Soviet-Hungarian border (see Figure 5). The Soviets dispatched elements of the 2d and 17th Mechanized Divisions into Budapest to quell the internal disturbance. These troops began to arrive in Budapest at 0200 on 24 October and closed in Budapest that afternoon.²⁷

C Lonel Maleter, commander of the Hungarian armored units at Kilian Barracks in Budapest, had joined the insurgent forces. His tanks opened fire on the Soviet troop column as they came near Kilian Barracks, taking them by surprise. In the four days of heavy fighting that followed,

²⁷ John Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution," Marine Corps Gazette, XLII (April 1958), 53-54.

LOCATION OF SOVIET DIVISIONS PRIOR TO 23 OCT 1956
LOCATION OF FIGHTING ON 24 AND 25 OCTOBER AS SHOWN BY ARROWS



the Soviet troops continuously attacked Kilian Barracks and failed to seize it. After Colonel Maleter's rejection of a surrender proposal, the Soviet forces withdrew from the city. Colonel Maleter became a national hero and was proclaimed the liberator of Budapest.²⁸

The Russians had committed approximately ten battalions to restore order in Budapest. These battalions were comprised of the tank and reconnaissance units of the two mechanized divisions. The battalions were generally committed piecemeal to extricate or support the Avos. The Soviets had hoped this action would gain their objective without developing further Hungarian hostility toward Soviet forces. This course of action failed and gave the Russians a humiliating defeat.²⁹ The Soviets had 320 tanks knocked out of action, and the 2d and the 17th Mechanized Divisions were rendered ineffective as combat units.³⁰

The revolution spread from Budapest to other cities in Hungary (see Figure 5). The Avos had fired on crowds in Győr and Magyaróvár, causing them to become insurgent armies.³¹ Revolutionary workers' councils were organized

²⁸ Fejto, pp. 201-203.


²⁹ Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, 56.

³⁰ Fejto, p. 205. ³¹ Lasky, p. 113.

throughout the Hungarian countryside to fight the Avos and the Soviet troops. The councils formed militias from their workers and took over the government of their respective areas. On 27 October a provisional national committee of the Gyor department was formed by the uniting of five councils in the Gyor area. This national committee then negotiated with the Russian commanders for withdrawal of Soviet forces.³² Figure 6 shows the territory held by the Hungarian workers of the Gyor district.

On 25 October Gero was dismissed as leader of the Central Committee by Mikoyan, a special envoy from Moscow, and Janos Kadar replaced him. Premier Nagy was trying to gain contact and control of the many revolutionary councils throughout Hungary despite Soviet agents who kept him under close surveillance. On 26 October Janos Kadar, in the name of the Central Committee, issued a manifesto giving approval to the workers' councils. Nagy announced that he would demand the evacuation of Soviet forces before January. The councils demanded that Nagy reorganize his government to include representatives of the workers, the intellectuals, and the youth groups. On 27 October Nagy formed a new compromise government. This new government was so diversified

³²Fejto, pp. 196-197.



1. 200 Kilometers

that no one knew what the government wanted or where it stood. Imre Nagy had the irreconcilable task of heading a government based on both communism and anti-communism.³³

The Soviets dispatched the 32d and the 34th Mechanized Divisions on 26 October from western Rumania to western Hungary to seal off the Austrian border (see Figure 6). These two divisions passed through Budapest on 27 October, and many observers thought the Soviets had launched a second assault on Budapest; however, the divisions had to go through Budapest because of the number of bridges required to cross the Danube River. The Soviet forces fought the freedom fighters in Budapest only to clear their routes through the city. The two divisions then sealed the Austrian border.³⁴

On 31 October, as the 2d and 17th Mechanized Divisions were evacuating Budapest, Premier Nagy broke his ties with the Soviets, declared Hungary's neutrality, and denounced the Warsaw Pact. Nagy began negotiations with Mikoyan for a new status for Hungary. Janos Kadar reorganized the Communist party and it was renamed the Hungarian Socialist Workers party. On the night of 1 November, Kadar

³³Fejto, pp. 217-221.

³⁴Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, 54-55.

mysteriously disappeared near the Soviet Embassy.³⁵


On or about 1 November, the Soviet divisions in the Subcarpathian Ruthenia section moved into eastern Hungary to secure jump-off positions (see Figure 7). The Soviet High Command formed an army of about 10 divisions with parts of an air army totaling over 120,000 men. General Malinin, who had been deputy chief of staff and head of the operations section for the Soviet Army, took command of this newly formed army. At 0300 on 4 November, the Russian Army began its attack. One-third of the force attacked Budapest. General Kiraly, military commandant of Budapest, defended the city with 400 men and 8 tanks. By 0800 the Soviet forces had achieved all of their main objectives in Budapest in the one-sided conflict. The Soviet Army continued to mop up scattered resistance for the next few days.³⁶ By 1600 on 7 November, the last organized resistance of the freedom fighters fell to the might of the Soviet Army.³⁷

On 9 November Janos Kadar returned to Budapest as a Soviet convert. He replaced Premier Nagy, who had sought asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy, and set up a puppet

³⁵Fejto, pp. 233-241.

³⁶Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, 56-57.

³⁷New York Times, 8 November 1956, p. 1.



government backed by the Soviet Army.³⁸

Conclusions

The military actions of the Soviet forces in Hungary were divided into two distinct and separate operations.³⁹

The first operation was a police action in which the 2d and the 17th Mechanized Divisions were committed to support the Avos, Hungarian secret police, in quelling the uprisings in Budapest. The Soviet forces were interested, at this point, in maintaining good public relations with the Hungarian people. Elements of the two divisions were employed piecemeal to support the Avos only where necessary. The Russians undoubtedly did not realize the degree of hatred and contempt the Hungarians held for the Avos. When the Soviet divisions allied themselves with the Avos, they found themselves in direct opposition to the Hungarian people.

The 2d and the 17th Mechanized Divisions were in Hungary to reinforce a supposedly reliable Hungarian Army.⁴⁰ When the Hungarian Army failed to respond to assist the Avos on 23 October, assisting the rebels instead, the Soviet forces retained the loyalty of only a few dedicated

³⁸Fejto, pp. 263 & 274.

³⁹Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, 54 & 56.

⁴⁰Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, 53.

Communists and the Avos. The two divisions had the task of bringing order to Hungary in a hostile environment. Their ties to the Hungarian secret police marked them as the enemy. The loss of the Hungarian Army loyalty left the Soviet forces with no common bond with the Hungarians. The humiliating defeat of the two divisions in Budapest made clear the point that more than a police action was needed in Hungary.

On 26 October the Soviets switched to a combat operation which had four phases. The first phase, the isolation of Hungary from the Free World, was accomplished by the 32d and the 34th Mechanized Divisions. In phase two, the Russians set up a secure attack area on northeast Hungary. This area enabled the Soviet Army to reorganize and prepare for combat after crossing the difficult mountain roads in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The third phase was the assault on Budapest and the rest of Hungary. This phase lasted less than twenty-four hours. The fourth phase was the mopping up of by-passed resistance areas. This phase lasted three days, ending on 7 November 1956.

There were indications that the third phase, the actual assault on Hungary, was started ahead of schedule.⁴¹ This was probably to take advantage of the current

⁴¹Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, 57.

anti-Western attitude of neutral nations caused by the Anglo-French attack on the Suez Canal and Egypt. The assault could have been conducted from Rumania over better routes instead of the mountainous routes of Subcarpathean Ruthenia, but the Soviets did not choose to use routes from Rumania as these routes lacked security from Western and neutral observers.⁴²

The Russians bought time needed for the second phase by offering to negotiate with the Hungarian Government and the workers' councils for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. These negotiations were being conducted while the Soviets were building up forces in northeastern Hungary. There was good coordination between Soviet political and military interests.

In conclusion, the following factors were significant in the Soviet military operation in Hungary:

1. There were two distinct and separate Soviet military operations in Hungary. The first operation was a police action, the second a combat operation.
2. In the first operation, the Soviet forces lacked a common bond with the Hungarian populace.

⁴²Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, 54.

3. Soviet forces were committed as a final solution to a political problem rather than to support negotiations.
4. The second operation, the combat operation, was conducted in four phases with four specific objectives: Phase I, to isolate Hungary from the non-communist world; Phase II, to build a base area for launching further operations; Phase III, to smash the Hungarian revolt; and Phase IV, to mop up pockets of resistance.
5. In the second operation, negotiations supported military actions and not vice versa.
6. Military force was further requested after the rebellion to insure a stable government.
7. The Hungarian revolt was an example of failure by police action and success by conquest in establishing a stable government.

CHAPTER IV

THE LEBANON CRISIS OF 1958

Events Leading to the Lebanon Crisis

On 23 September 1952, Camille Shamun became the second president of Lebanon. Bisharah al-Khuri, the first president, was forced to resign because of political corruption and failure to improve the Lebanon economic situation.¹ Shamun, in his first three years as president, retained a high degree of popularity among the people of Lebanon. He introduced reforms in the government which kept corruption and waste to a minimum, and the Lebanon economy prospered well above others of the Middle East. Shamun made state visits to his sister Arab states and reinforced relations with them. He acted as mediator and peacemaker of disputes that arose between the Arab states. From 1952 to 1955, President Shamun was well-established as the political leader of Lebanon.²

¹New York Times, 19 September 1952, p. 8.

²Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 25.

In 1955 the Baghdad Pact was created, and this act formalized the split between the traditional Arab states and states advocating Arab nationalism. Lebanon was unhappily caught in the middle. The Christian segment of the Lebanese society wanted Lebanon to join the Baghdad Pact; the Muslim segment opposed the pact. President Shamun favored the Baghdad Pact and this, along with his planned exchange state visits with President Bayar of Turkey, gave rise to strong opposition by Muslim leaders to the Shamun administration.³

The relations between Lebanon and Syria were strained because of the incompatibility of their economic systems. Syria maintained a policy of economic nationalism approaching autarchy whereas Lebanon followed a policy of laissez faire.⁴ Lebanon also provided a haven for political refugees of Syria's volatile political system. These poor relations reached powderkeg proportions on 22 April 1955, when Colonel Adnan of Maliki, adjutant to the Syrian chief of staff, was assassinated and President Shamun was implicated in the plot.⁵ This situation caused Syria to consider Shamun its enemy and began to work toward his downfall. It

³Qubain, p. 39.

⁴Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 234.

⁵Qubain, p. 36.

also furthered the split within the Lebanese society since the Muslim element felt that Syria was not properly considered by Shamun.

During the Suez crisis of 1956, Lebanon did not join her sister Arab states in condemning Great Britain and France for their acts of violence inflicted upon Egypt. Shamun further antagonized the Muslim element of Lebanon by appointing Charles Malik, a pro-Western sympathizer, as the foreign minister of Lebanon.

On 16 March 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was officially accepted by the government of Lebanon.⁶ This action caused the cabinet to participate in a parliamentary debate and submit to a vote of confidence by the parliament. A three-day debate was conducted and the government won a vote of confidence, but only after a heated debate and the resignation of seven deputies from the Chamber.

The first organized opposition group appeared in April 1957. It was a predominantly Muslim organization called the United National Front.⁷ The Front supported Nasser in his beliefs, but no known Communists were members. The Front included the Najjadah (Muslim youth movement), the

⁶ New York Times, 17 March 1958, p. 1.

⁷ Qubain, pp. 49-50.

National Organization (moderate Muslim group), Progressive Socialist Party (pan-Arab socialists), the National Call (Arab nationalists), and the Constitutional Bloc (followers of ex-President al-Khuri. The United National Front wanted the Chamber increased to eighty-eight members so as to include more pro-Nasser members. It also wanted a new neutral cabinet to oversee the coming June elections. The Front feared that Shamun would block effective Muslim representation in the government; however, it did not resort to extralegal or violent means in order to achieve its goals at this time.

On 27 May 1957, President Shamun was informed by the United National Front that unless he replaced his cabinet with a neutral cabinet to oversee the elections, the Front would conduct a general strike. The government retaliated by announcing that such action would lead to breach of the peace. The police and the Army were asked to be prepared to enforce the peace. On 30 May the United National Front conducted a march on the main avenue in Beirut.⁸ The police intercepted the march and violence resulted. Approximately ten persons were killed and about one hundred were wounded. The Army had to intervene, and peace was restored by the end

⁸Qubain, p. 54.

of the afternoon. Three hundred and fifty marchers were arrested. Tales of police terrorism, although not verified, and the raising of the civilian dead to martyr status gave rise to lawlessness. The United National Front lost the physical battle, but they gained in power and political prestige from the anti-government sentiment that developed.

Saib Salam, a United National Front leader, received a head wound in the riot and suddenly became a national hero.⁹ While he was in the hospital, he went on a hunger strike until the cabinet members would be replaced. The United National Front continued its general strike. General Shihab finally stepped in and settled the crisis with a compromise between the government and the Front. The compromise called for two new neutral cabinet ministers along with two old government ministers to supervise the forthcoming elections.

For security reasons, the elections were held on four successive Sundays over four different parts of Lebanon. President Shamun and his followers won a landslide victory. On 17 June the two new neutral ministers of the cabinet resigned because they could not tolerate the general atmosphere and various pressures placed on the voters. The two

⁹Qubain, p. 55.

neutral ministers agreed that the technical procedures were properly followed. They hinted, however, that the voters were under undue pressures and the elections were a fraud.¹⁰ The United National Front held that Shamun openly meddled with the election.

Tensions continued to mount following the election. Lebanon banned Egyptian and Syrian newspapers. Syrian subversive actions increased in Lebanon as clashes between Lebanese border patrols and Syrian armed bands flared up more intensely. On 1 February 1958, Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). This unification caused Arab nationalism in Lebanon to swell with hope. Despite a government ban on demonstrations, the nationalists closed down schools and demonstrated in the major cities of Lebanon to celebrate the merger. On 9 February a delegation from the United National Front visited Damascus to pay their respects to the new state. An invitation was offered the delegation to join the new republic to guarantee the existence of Lebanon's freedom from imperialism. The delegation stated that Lebanon would join the UAR when the great majority of Lebanese were convinced of the advantages of joining.

On 24 February 1958, President Nasser visited

¹⁰Qubain, p. 57.

Damascus and his reception was tumultuous.¹¹ Thousands of Lebanese traveled to Damascus to see and hear Nasser. Arab nationalism was indeed stirred. Nasser's visit widened the gap between the Muslim and Christian factions within Lebanon. Throughout March, April, and May there were many incidents in Lebanon involving disrespect to the Lebanese flag, Shamun and his government. Nasser's picture and the UAR flag were displayed in many prominent places. Riots flared up in many cities, causing the police to open fire. The atmosphere in the cities was extremely volatile.

To add to the unstable situation, Georage Agl, a pro-Shamun deputy, announced on 10 April that he was going to propose a constitutional amendment to permit President Shamun to succeed himself as president. Charges were made in the Chamber that the government was arming its supporters. On 20 April, Prime Minister Sami al Sulik and his guests were celebrating the Muslim religious event of Bayram at his home when explosives were detonated outside.¹² The Army, under General Shihab, remained aloof and ignored the riots and acts of violence.

The Lebanese Army did not become politically

¹¹New York Times, 27 February 1958, p. 5.

¹²New York Times, 21 April 1958, p. 4.

involved with the revolt because General Shihab, Chief of Staff, felt the Army existed to defend Lebanon from foreign aggression and not to subdue the wishes of the Lebanese people.¹³ Many of the opposition leaders were General Shihab's friends with high station in Lebanese life, and his respect for them modified any action he might have taken against them. Lastly, the Army itself was made up of both Muslims and Christians. Army support on one side or the other could have split the Army and ruined it as an effective fighting force.

Thus, President Shamun did not have the support of the Army in this internal conflict. He did have the support of the police and the gendarmes, but their support was limited because of lack of numbers and materiel to wage war. Shamun also had the support of many civilians loyal to his cause. These civilians fell into three groups: the Christians who feared Muslim supremacy; the Phalanges, Maronites who feared Arab nationalism; and the PPS, an Iraqi supported organization that worked toward the Fertile Crescent concept of Iraqi expansion independent of the UAR. These groups gave President Shamun forces to oppose the rebels.

¹³Robert Mills McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XXCVIII (October 1962), 67.

The spark was set to the political powderkeg in Lebanon on 8 May 1958. Nasib al-Matni, a strong critic of Shamun and publisher of Beirut's daily Arabic newspaper, was murdered.¹⁴ He had been imprisoned several times for his newspaper attacks on Shamun and for his drive to foster better relations with the UAR. On his person at the time of death were four letters containing threats to kill him if he continued his attacks on Shamun's government. This murder caused a tremendous reaction throughout Lebanon. New political groups reinforced the United National Front in declaring a general strike against the government. The Front demanded that President Shamun resign and that elections be held for a new president.

The refusal of President Shamun to resign brought on radical action, the armed revolt. A thousand Muslims in Tripoli battled with the police during a demonstration that lasted 9 to 11 May. The Muslims destroyed the United States Information Library and did extensive damage to the city. Thirteen persons were killed and ten were injured.

On 12 May the anti-government forces blocked most of the roads leading out of Beirut. Sporadic fighting and explosions were heard throughout the city. The Christian

¹⁴New York Times, 9 May 1958, p. 2.

sections of Beirut were all that the government could effectively control. The Army declared the Muslim sections of the city off limits to government forces.

The opposition forces in Sidon were over one thousand strong and took complete control of the city. They set up an opposition government which expanded the fighting into the neighboring countryside.

Much of the rural area of Lebanon was under control of the opposition forces (see Figure 8). The government force could control parts of these areas only when backed up with force. The opposition forces were receiving arms and support from Syria.¹⁵

On 22 May the government of Lebanon forwarded a complaint concerning interference in its internal affairs to the United Nations Security Council and requested action in restraining the UAR from supporting the revolt. On 11 June the Security Council adopted a resolution to organize and send into Lebanon the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).¹⁶ This organization reported on 3 July that there were no definite indications of UAR interference in Lebanon; however, UNOGIL was quite limited in its power

¹⁵ McClintock, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 66-67.

¹⁶ United Nations Review, V (July 1958), 37.




Figure 1. Opposition Held Territory in Syria

to investigate and its effectiveness was questionable.¹⁷

To add to the turmoil, on 14 July revolutionary forces overthrew the government of Iraq, and Jordan discovered a plot to overthrow its youthful monarch. Fearing that President Shamun might be overthrown next, the United States landed marines at Beirut on 15 July. Two days later Great Britain sent two battalions of paratroopers to Jordan at the request of King Hussein.

Causes of Governmental Instability

Lebanon became an independent state in 1946 when France relinquished its mandate over the Lebanese people. The current boundaries of Lebanon were drawn by the French. Thus, the state of Lebanon was made a foreign power, rather than by the common allegiance or nationalism of the people living there. The people of Lebanon demonstrated no popular urge to unite on a national basis and their basic loyalties were to religion and race. The Economic Research Institute of the American University of Beirut stated that in 1956 the religious preferences of the Lebanon population¹⁸ were as follows:

¹⁷McClintock, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 68-69.

¹⁸Qubain, p. 8.

Muslims and Druze		624,000
Christians:--		
Maronites	424,000	
Greek Orthodox	149,000	
Greek Catholics	91,000	
Armenian Orthodox	64,000	
Others	<u>45,000</u>	773,000
Jews		7,000
Miscellaneous		<u>7,000</u>
		1,411,000

The different religious sects tended to live in certain areas of Lebanon and to avoid social intercourse with other sects. The Christian community considered itself an island in the Muslim sea, and the Christians looked to France and Europe for protection from an insecure position. Under French mandate, the Christians had enjoyed political advantage. After the French left Lebanon, the Christians were able to control the Chamber of Deputies. The Christians far outnumbered the Muslims in civil service, key government posts, and the military.¹⁹

The constitution of Lebanon was called the National Covenant. It was basically a compromise agreement between the Christians and the Muslims for the organization and operation of the government of Lebanon. It provided that neither religious group would seek to bring Lebanon under foreign influence and that both groups would seek to keep Lebanon an independent sovereign state. The covenant held

¹⁹Qubain, p. 30.

that Lebanon would be an Arab country in culture and language but would retain its Western cultural ties. Public offices were to be distributed equally among the different religious factions: the president would always be a Maronite; the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the president of the parliament, a Shia Muslim. The president of Lebanon, the most influential position in the government, could not succeed himself at the end of his six year term of office. The National Covenant set a very fine balance upon which the government of Lebanon was to operate. The disregard of this balance was the basic cause of the Lebanon Crisis.

President Shamun's failure to act for the welfare of the Lebanese people as a whole and his attempts to change the National Covenant were the primary contributing factors in causing his government to falter. Shamun was the political leader, in reality, of the Christian segment of Lebanese society. Muslims were deprived of government positions; as president, Shamun did not assist them. He took no initiative in providing educational facilities for the Muslims to raise their standards to equal those of the Christian population. Poverty, disease, and ignorance were allowed to run rampant in Muslim quarters while the Christians prospered.²⁰

²⁰Qubain, p. 31.

Instead of reducing the differences that existed between the Muslim and Christian segments, Shamun enlarged these differences and put Lebanese unity further in abeyance.

The Muslims feared that President Shamun would try to amend the constitution so he could succeed himself for another six year term.²¹ This fear reinforced the Muslim suspicion that the Christians were purposely violating the basic agreement of government, the National Covenant, in an attempt to gain Christian domination over the Muslims. In the 1957 parliamentary elections, the Muslim leaders had hoped to gain sufficient political influence to elect a president in 1958 who would be more sympathetic to the Muslim cause. It was fairly evident that Shamun used undue pressure in the elections and retained control of the Chamber. This action, along with his nepotism and corruption, made the Muslims determined that Shamun would not return as president after the end of his first term.²²

The Muslim in Lebanon felt he was considered a second-rate citizen who could not look to his government for assistance. In fact, his government was not only refusing to assist him in his effort to improve his situation, it was

²¹McClintock, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 66.

²²Qubain, pp. 33-34.

suppressing him. The Muslims, therefore, considered that they had to seek extralegal methods to gain the political power they needed for equality with the Christians. These methods were extended to bombing, riots, assassination, and, finally, rebellion. The Muslims could not have achieved their goal from their own domestic resources. They needed foreign assistance and received it.

The economic and political conditions between Syria and Lebanon had degenerated to a hostile state. The lack of a valid economic agreement to bridge their economic divergences added to this hostility. The Ba'th party, which controlled the Syrian Government, stood for Arab unity and viewed President Shamun's government as an obstacle to this unity.²³ As a result, the Syrian Government supported the Lebanese anti-government forces with men, money, and materials. It is noted that the rebel movement was strongest along the Syrian border.

The politics in the Middle East were splitting into two opposing camps. The conservative traditional camp was led by Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The Arab nationalist camp was led by Nasser of Egypt. Nasser's revolutionary movement among the Arab nations gained momentum with the

²³Qubain, p. 37.

union of Syria and Egypt. Nasser's goal was Arab unity through socialism. He encouraged revolt against the traditional Arab governments through propaganda and subversion. The revolt in Iraq and the plot to eliminate King Hussein of Jordan were actions backed by Nasser.²⁴ These actions furthered the instability of the Lebanese Government. Nasser's boldness and success encouraged the Lebanese Muslims to attempt an overthrow of the government and weakened the Christians' faith in the ability of the Lebanese Government to protect them from the Muslim threat.

The political situation had East-West overtones that added to the instability of the Lebanese Government. With the fall of Nuri al-Said of Iraq, the Baghdad Pact began to crumble and the East-West balance in the Middle East began to collapse.²⁵ Nasser accepted communist assistance though he kept his Arab socialism apart from the communist movement. To further the turmoil in the Middle East, the Soviet Union conducted maneuvers along its border common to Turkey and Iran.

The crisis in Lebanon can be attributed to many

²⁴Robert Strausz-Hupe, "U.S. Future in Middle East--Real Meaning of the Crisis," US News & World Report, XLV (25 July 1958), 64.

²⁵Strausz-Hupe, US News & World Report, 64-65.

factors which reacted together and reinforced each other. The basic causes of President Shamun's governmental instability were:

1. Muslim inequality
2. Christian insecurity
3. Corruption in government
4. Attempt to change the National Covenant
5. Economic divergencies between Lebanon and Syria
6. Nasser's revolutionary movements
7. East-West conflict in the Middle East

President Shamun failed to meet these factors as they applied to Lebanon and, in many cases, he added to the effectiveness of these factors; thus, it was necessary for foreign military and political action to restore a stable government in Lebanon.

Military Action To Assist the
Government of Lebanon

On 15 July 1958, President Eisenhower made a prepared statement to the world, a portion of which follows:

In response to this appeal from the government of Lebanon, the United States has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and, by their presence there, to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity.²⁶

²⁶"United States Dispatches Troops to Lebanon,"

The code name of the operation was Operation BLUEBAT. H-hour was planned to be 1500 Lebanese time so as to permit the notification of the United Nations of landing of American forces. During this period, the U. S. Navy had the Second Provisional Marine Force afloat in the eastern Mediterranean. Brig. Gen. Sidney S. Wade commanded the marine force, which contained three battalion landing teams (BLT): BLT 1/8, commanded by Lt. Col. J. H. Brickley; BLT 2/2, commanded by Lt. Col. H. A. Hadd; and BLT 3/6, commanded by Lt. Col. R. M. Jenkins.²⁷

BLUEBAT plans called for BLT 2/2 to land on Red Beach at 1500 on D-day and seize the Beirut International Airport (see Figure 9). The next day, 16 July, BLT 3/6 was to land on Red Beach, relieve BLT 2/2, and secure the Beirut International Airport. The BLT 2/2 was to move, by column, through Beirut and secure the port facilities. The command ships, USS Pocono and USS Taconic, would then enter the harbor and dock. On D plus 3 the BLT 1/8 was to land on Yellow Beach and secure the beachhead to the northeast. With the initial phase of the operation completed, reinforcements were to be brought into the area as needed.

Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX (4 August 1958), 181.

²⁷Sidney S. Wade, "Operation BLUEBAT," Marine Corps Gazette, XLIII (July 1959), 13.




Figure 9. Marine Landing Plan in Lebanon.

In accordance with the BLUEBAT plans, BLT 2/2 conducted an amphibious assault on Red Beach at 1504 on 15 July 1958. The assault was unopposed and cheered on by friendly, interested crowds of vendors, children, and other civilian spectators. By 1600 the BLT had secured its initial objective, the Beirut International Airport, without any incidents or difficulties. Just prior to the assault on Red Beach, Ambassador McClintock, the American ambassador to Lebanon, had informed President Shamun and General Shihab of the impending landing. Shamun was overjoyed to receive the news. General Shihab had mixed feelings on the matter. He was worried that the landings would cause the Lebanese Army to join the opposition forces and defend the beaches against the foreign intruders.²⁸ General Shihab asked Ambassador McClintock to reconsider and not permit the marines to land. McClintock did not attempt to stop the landing, and the Lebanese Army did not resist the landing. Beirut remained calm through the night of 15 July, but the suspense was building up over what reaction the opposition forces or the Lebanese Army might consider taking.

On 16 July the BLT 3/6 landed on Red Beach and relieved BLT 2/2 at the airport. The BLT 2/2 prepared to

²⁸Qubain, p. 116.

move out as an armored column to secure its next objective, the dock area in Beirut (see Figure 10). Ambassador McClintock asked General Wade not to move BLT 2/2 then because General Shihab felt the marines would run into heavy fighting in the Basta area of Beirut, a Muslim stronghold. It was further learned that General Shihab had placed Lebanese armor units between the Basta area and the marine column. General Wade delayed the movement of BLT 2/2 for a half-hour and was about to leave the location where the BLT 2/2 was halted when Ambassador McClintock arrived in his car with General Shihab. General Shihab requested that the marines take a route to the docks that would by-pass the Basta area. General Wade refused since that would require taking the rest of the day to close in and secure the docks. Ambassador McClintock suggested that General Shihab and he head the column into the city. General Shihab agreed. They proceeded to lead the marine column into Beirut. The column was halted many times; however, General Shihab and Ambassador McClintock were able to negotiate the marine column through the Lebanese Army and Muslim strong points. At 1500 the BLT 2/2 secured the dock area without open conflict. At the end of D plus 1, the marines had two battalions ashore and had secured the airport, dock area, and key installations within the city.




Figure 10. Critical Areas in Beirut, Lebanon.

Source: New York Times, 17 Jul. 1987, p. 3.

On D plus 2 the marines consolidated their positions in Beirut. Generals Shihab and Wade held a conference at General Shihab's house, twelve miles north of Beirut.²⁹ It was agreed that each marine battalion would have a liaison officer from the Lebanese Army, as would General Wade's headquarters. It was further agreed that the Lebanese Army would control rebel outbreaks and the marines would become involved only when absolutely necessary. General Shihab asked the marines to leave Beirut in such a manner that the city would not appear to be under occupation. General Wade redeployed some of his forces, and the occupation was not quite so obvious. The situation in Beirut was relatively secure, but the main threat was the Syrian Army with its modern Russian tanks located three hours away.

On D plus 3 the BLT 1/8 landed north of Beirut on Yellow Beach. It proceeded to secure the area northeast of Beirut. The Second Battalion of the Eighth Marines were airlifted into Beirut to assume the role of force reserve.

The 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, was airtransported from Augsburg, Germany, to arrive in Beirut on D plus 4.³⁰ It was followed by the remainder of the 24th


²⁹Wade, Marine Corps Gazette, 14.

³⁰Wade, Marine Corps Gazette, 15.

Airborne Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. David Gray. On 29 July the airborne brigade replaced BLT 3/6. The BLT 3/6 then occupied a position on the south flank of BLT 1/8.

On 26 July Maj. Gen. Paul Adams became the Commander, American Land Forces in Lebanon (see Figure 11). The situation had stabilized. The Lebanese and American forces had joint motorized patrols throughout Beirut. The American forces dug in defensive positions to protect the city from attacks by either the Syrian or rebel forces. Motorized patrols were sent to the outlying towns and villages to test the attitude of the population in those areas.

The first obstacle to the political crisis was overcome on 31 July when General Shihab was elected as the new president of the Chamber by a majority of 48 to 7. General Shihab did not want to enter the political area, but he was urged by different political factions to accept the position in the interest of Lebanese unity. With the ending of President Shamun's term and his ambition to remain in office, a number of the causes for the rebellion were removed. The opposition and the pro-government forces accepted Shihab as president. Rashid Karami, the opposition leader in Tripoli, became the prime minister. After much trial and error, Karami formed a cabinet that was accepted by all factions. On 14 October the crisis had passed. It is interesting to



Wade, Sidney S. "Operation Bluebat," *Marine Corps Gazette*, July, 1959, p 19.

Figure 11. Organization Chart of American Land Forces in Lebanon.¹

note that in September most of the various factions were united in calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanese soil.

On 10 September a reinforced marine company conducted an amphibious assault twenty miles north of Beirut as a training exercise. A helicopterborne company from the 187th Airborne Infantry joined in the exercise, which was run publicly for the local citizens. More than 5,000 Lebanese watched the exercise and cheered loudly as Lebanese officers, who were observers, rode on American combat vehicles. This helped the public relations of U. S. Forces, as did the estimated two and a half million dollars the American soldiers spent in Beirut while on pass.

In October the American forces had completed their mission and began to withdraw. The mission was accomplished without inflicting any casualties on the Lebanese people. The American forces had fewer than eight fatalities, including both accident and combat casualties.³¹ The American forces performance in Lebanon was superior in all aspects.

Conclusions

The strategic objective of the contingent of United States forces dispatched to Lebanon was presented in the

³¹Qubain, p. 120.

statement by President Eisenhower on 15 July 1958: ". . . to protect American lives and, by their presence there, to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity."³² On the basis of this statement and actions of American forces, the military objective was not to intervene in the domestic political disputes between the opposition and the pro-government forces. After 15 July 1958 the military forces of Lebanon and the United States did take action when political disputes erupted into violence. The presence of military forces in Lebanon was not to insure President Shamun's political power. If this were the situation, President Shamun's base of power would be foreign and Lebanese sovereignty and integrity would not exist. The first objective of the military forces was to prevent the occurrence of physical violence in Lebanon.

Political instability was further intensified by the assistance of foreign powers. The revolutionaries of the UAR infiltrated Lebanon with agents, weapons, and propaganda. The power that gave credulity to the claims of the UAR was the modern army of Syria, located three hours from Beirut and opposed only by a weak Lebanese Army whose will to fight was questionable. The American forces entry into Lebanon

³²"United States Dispatches Troops to Lebanon," Department of State Bulletin, 181.

balanced the unchallenged power of the Syrian Army. The second objective of the military forces in Lebanon was to prevent foreign intervention by physical force.

Military force reduced the Lebanon crisis to an area or sphere of internal political problems. The U. S. Forces gave security to the Christian element of Lebanon, blocked Nasser's revolutionary movement progress, and basically eliminated East-West conflict in Lebanon. The problem of Muslim inequality, corruption in government, and Shamun's attempt to change the National Covenant had to be solved by political process. The U. S. Armed Forces did indirectly influence the political process by not backing President Shamun or any other person for the presidency, thereby helping influence Shamun to give up running for a second term. This political neutrality of American Forces paved the way for the balance of power between the Muslims and Christians. This balance was established by General Shihab when he formed the new government. The third objective, which was implied, was that the U. S. Forces were not to become directly involved in the domestic political problem of establishing or maintaining a basis of government in Lebanon.

The military planners had to translate strategic objectives into tactical missions. It was evident, as in all military operations, that a secure base for logistical

support and communications had to be established in Lebanon. With no land routes convenient to Lebanon, United States forces were forced to use sea lanes for sustained routes of communications, supplemented by air transportation. The initial tactical objectives were to secure the Beirut International Airport and the Beirut harbor with its docks. Then a perimeter was established around the outskirts of the city to secure the American base from outside attack or violence.

Securing a base of operations in Lebanon was the first tactical objective and was accomplished according to military doctrine, with two prime exceptions. The first exception was that the Beirut docks objective was seized by direct negotiations with the opposition and not by fire and maneuver. The assault element was the American Ambassador reinforced by a battalion landing team. Negotiations at the tactical level permitted the marines to seize their objective without casualties, the opposition to maintain its local political and military status within Beirut, and the U. S. Forces to maintain a neutral position. An armed conflict between the marines and Muslims in the Basta area of Beirut would have driven the Muslim opposition further from accepting United States mediation for a political settlement.

The second exception to established military doctrine was the execution of the amphibious assault in the

middle of the afternoon. Had the amphibious landing been conducted during early morning hours, the U. S. Forces could have seized both its initial objectives on D-day and would have given any opposition less time to react; however, the political consideration of coinciding the landings with the notification to the United Nations organization was held to be more important than tactical considerations.

As a foreign element in the Lebanese polity, the U. S. forces needed common values to share with the Lebanese society in order to make it an effective cohesive force within the society. Until 15 July 1958 General Shihab maintained that the Lebanese Army should stay aloof in internal political strife and should be concerned only with foreign invasions or military interference. General Shihab could have decided that the U. S. forces were invading and could have opposed the landings. The most critical point in the Lebanon operation was the meeting on D plus 1 with Ambassador McClintock, General Shihab, and General Wade at the head of the BLT 2/2 column of advance into Beirut. This meeting compromised the U. S. Forces and the Lebanese Army objectives into a joint objective. General Shihab agreed that the Lebanese Army would take action to control the violence that could occur between pro-government forces and the opposition. General Wade agreed to let the Lebanese Army take

over his first strategic objective of preventing physical violence. This compromise aligned the U. S. Forces with the common interests of the opposing forces in Lebanon, the Lebanese Army, and made the U. S. Forces an acceptable intervening force to the Lebanese people.

As the fever pitch of the crisis subsided, the U. S. force exploited its relationship with the Lebanese people by public military demonstrations and by increasing the tourist trade. Action was taken to prevent the American soldier from appearing as an intruder. A minimum of military strong-points were occupied in Beirut by the U. S. soldiers. The bulk of U. S. Forces were kept in defensive positions on the outskirts of Beirut.

In conclusion, the following factors were significant in the military operation in Lebanon:

1. Definite strategic objectives were established and suitable tactical objectives were translated from these strategic objectives.
2. A secure military logistical base was a necessity, and this was one of the immediate tactical objectives of the forces involved.
3. Combat power supported negotiations in the achievement of tactical objectives.
4. Military forces avoided showing partiality to

any factions in the political crisis.

5. Military forces aligned themselves with the values that were common to all factions of the assisted society.
6. Minimum forces necessary to accomplish objectives were committed.
7. Public relations was a critical consideration.
8. Maximum use of indigenous military forces was preferable to use of foreign forces.
9. Military forces could not secure political solutions to a crisis, but they did influence the situation to effect a more favorable environment for political solution.
10. Upon accomplishment of strategic objectives, the foreign military forces were withdrawn.
11. The tactical commanders should have had the power to make the necessary decisions or to change orders when the situation dictated such action.
12. The local tactical commander needed a knowledge of the economic, political, and religious systems of the assisted country, plus the knowledge of the mores of its society.

PART II. DEVELOPMENT OF A DOCTRINE

CHAPTER V

GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY

To better understand government and causes of its instability, it is necessary to review the background in which the government must function. The state is the principal political unit for the regulation of human intercourse. There is no higher sovereign organization than the state. The state must have four essential elements to maintain its status: defined territory, people, a government, and sovereignty. A state losing any one of these elements ceases to exist as such.¹

A state must have territory on which to base its existence. Israel, at the end of World War II, had a Jewish population and a Jewish government; it exercised a degree of sovereignty over its people; but it was not a state until it secured its own territory from the British and the Arabs in the Middle East. The power of the state is dependent on its territory. The location, size, shape, climate, and

¹Raymond Garfield Gettell, Political Science (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1933), pp. 17-18.

resources of the territory help determine the power of the state (such as the United States contrasted to Iceland).²

An uninhabited territory such as Antarctica cannot be a basis for a state. Without humans there can be no regulation of human intercourse. The state is dependent on the quality (e.g., education and attitude) and quantity of its population for its power. The quantity (80 million) and quality of the Japanese population in comparison with the quantity (8 million) and quality of the Peruvian population provides Japan a marked power advantage over Peru.

A state must have a government, or anarchy will exist. The Australian aborigines, prior to the 18th century, occupied a defined territory with a degree of sovereignty, but they lacked an effective government. The aborigines had no means of collective action and could not form a state.

"In its broader sense, then, the government may be defined as the sum total of those organizations that exercise or may exercise the sovereign powers of the state."³

The state must have sovereignty to exist as a political entity. Sovereignty is the collective authority a

²Carlton Clymer Rodee, Totton James Anderson, and Carl Quimby Christol, Introduction to Political Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957), pp. 26-27.

³Gettell, p. 22.

group of people gives to their government.

The concept of sovereignty is the basis of modern political science. It underlies the validity of all law and determines all international relations. It may be briefly outlined as follows. The state comes into being when an independent group of people are organized by means of a government which creates and enforces laws. Within this group there must be supremacy of will and power. It must contain some person or body of persons whose commands receive obedience and who can, if necessary, execute those commands by means of force. Such person or body of persons exercises sovereignty, and such commands are called laws.⁴

The constitution of the state decides the amount of sovereign power that will be given to its government and the amount of power that will be retained by individuals or groups of individuals. If the constitution gave full sovereign power to the government, the government would have absolute sovereignty in matters of internal affairs. The constitution also decides the form of government. It defines whether the sovereign power of the government should rest with one person (monarchy), few persons (oligarchy), or most of its citizens (democracy).⁵

The constitution reflects the will or consent of the overriding majority of the population of the state. If the consent of the masses is not obtained, then a constitution

⁴Gettell, p. 188.

⁵Leslie Lipson, The Great Issues of Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), pp. 261-263.

or a sovereign state will not exist. The consent does not have to be positive. If a minority forms a constitution which the majority dislikes, but the majority takes no action to change it, then the majority has accepted the constitution.

The constitution does not have to be written (e.g., Great Britain). The constitution is the accepted understanding of the citizens in a state on the relationship of sovereign powers. The written constitution is not always a reflection of the actual constitution (e.g., USSR). The constitution is a manifestation of the state which gives a political basis to a legal government.

The government is an instrument of state, and the state generally gives only a portion of its sovereign power to the government and retains the remaining sovereign powers for its citizens. The government, with its given powers, must perform certain functions for the state. These functions fall into three categories: security, regulation of social conflicts, and social progress.⁶

The first function is that of maintaining the security and existence of the state. The government must protect

⁶Cortez A. Ewing and Jewell Cass Phillips, Essentials of National Government (New York: American Book Co., 1962), pp. 4 & 332.

the state from the conflicting interests of other states; therefore, most governments have diplomatic agencies and armed forces to protect the interests of the state from foreign interests. The government must provide security for the individual from the powers of the state. This is accomplished by civil rights programs and legislation based on constitutional sanctions. The government must provide security for its citizens from the attacks of other citizens. This security is provided by criminal legislation, police protection, and judicial action of the government.⁷

The second function of the government is regulation of social conflicts that may exist between individuals, individuals versus the state, and individuals versus foreign states. Many social conflicts are resolved by the parties themselves, and governmental action is not necessary. If the conflicts are not resolved and the disputes increase, the government must take action to resolve the differences. If the conflicts were permitted to expand, the consensus that established the constitution and the state could be placed in jeopardy. The government resolves these conflicts by civil courts, regulatory commissions, and legislative action.

⁷Gettell, p. 379.

The third function, that of insuring social progress, is not always an essential function. The idea that social progress is a governmental responsibility is a relatively new phenomenon. Governments first became fully involved in social progress in the field of education during the 18th century. Health and personal welfare were considered a private matter until the 20th century.⁸ It is only now that governments are beginning to receive the full impact of the responsibilities for social progress that are being demanded of them by their citizens. This function is not essential to all governments; but the trend indicates that most governments, in time, will assume this function in full.

From the discussion of the functions of government, it is shown that the government, as the agent of the state, functions in three different relationships. The first relationship is that of the representative of the state in foreign affairs or a state versus state relationship. The second relationship is that of an umpire between the citizens versus the government itself, a situation in which the government "wears two hats." The last relationship is that of judge and jury, with the government resolving conflicts

⁸Ewing and Phillips, p. 332.

between its individual citizens. Governmental instability develops if the government fails to function according to the expectations of its citizen body in each of these relationships.⁹

To maintain stability, the government must resolve the conflicts between individual citizens and groups of citizens to the satisfaction of the citizenry. Domestic conflicts of low intensity are generally resolved short of political action by means of private compromise. If the citizens in conflict cannot resolve the dispute and the dispute becomes political, reaching a high intensity, the government should use its constitutional powers and resolve the conflict by civil court action, regulatory commission decree, or legislative act. Since the government has the dominant power within the state, the citizens must accept the political decision or resort to violence to overcome the power of the government. If the conflict is not satisfactorily resolved politically and the intensity of the conflict is violent, attempts may be made to alter the political decision by force starting with violent threats and assassination and ending with a coup d'etat or civil war. The citizens in conflict are satisfied with the form of government,

⁹Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 264.

the constitution and the state, but they are dissatisfied with the political elite who made the political decision against their case. If violence continues and expands to the point that the government no longer has the dominant power in the state, the government is unstable and cannot carry out its function of regulation of conflicting interests.

The relationship between the government and its citizens is a second area in which the stability of a government may be threatened.¹⁰ The constitution is a dynamic compromise of power between the government and its citizens. The power needs of the government change as well as the citizens' concept of power that the government needs. Social intercourse, such as public opinion polls, public speeches, and editorials, informs the political elite just what amount of governmental power the citizenry will tolerate and just what power the citizenry wants to retain for civil rights. If the political elite act according to the demands of its citizens, there will be little conflict in the government-citizen power relationship. If the political elite fails to follow the wishes of the citizens, the citizens can resort

¹⁰ Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), pp. 19-22.

to a political decision of judicial review and constitutional amendments. If the political decision is unsatisfactory, the citizens may resort to violence if the conflict intensity is high enough. The violent conflict could take the form of an insurgency or, if the conflict is supported by the people as a whole and resources are available, a revolutionary war may take place. When the government's dominance is challenged and the government loses, it is unstable. The revolutionaries will want a new government and a new constitution. If the attempted revolution is successful, a new government will emerge.

The stability of a government can be threatened by the third type of relationship, conflict between states. Conflicts in commerce, fishing rights, communications, and tourist trade are often solved by agreements between people, corporations, universities, and religious organizations of the two states involved, without their governments' becoming involved. If the conflict is not resolved by the conflicting parties, the governments concerned must negotiate to reach a mutually acceptable solution. If such a negotiated solution is not obtained, a state may resort to force and violence. A state may try to intervene in the affairs of its opponent state. Intervention is defined as "acts of interference either in the domestic or foreign affairs of

another state which violate that state's independence."¹¹

An act of intervention threatens the stability of the government. A foreign power challenges the dominant power of the state within its territory. By propaganda, political activities, guerrilla action, and show of force, the intervening power may negate the support of the local population to its government and weaken its position as the dominant force in its own state. If intervention does not produce the desired results, international war is the only and final recourse for the resolution of the conflict.

In summary, the government is the political manager of the affairs of state.

Politics may be defined as the art and practice of achieving group ends against the opposition of other groups. It implies that a practitioner of the art has identified himself with one state, one nation, one party, one government, or one group of some kind and is seeking to achieve the ends of that group against the opposition of other groups. Conflict is its essence. People engaged in politics are engaged in a battle, if not of bullets then of ballots, if not of armies then of rhetoric, if not of strategy, then of persuasion.¹²

It is the task of the government to find solutions to problems of security, social regulation, and social

¹¹J. L. Brierly, The Laws of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 308.

¹²Quincy Wright, Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), p. 116.

progress. The government must solve these problems in domestic conflicts, conflicts between the government and its citizens, and conflicts between its state and foreign states. To facilitate further discussion, the three problem areas are called the domestic conflict area, the sovereignty conflict area, and the international conflict area (see Figure 12). The government may become unstable because of violent conflict in any one of the areas or because of conflict in any combination of areas. Each conflict area may have problems of security, social regulation, and social progress.

The problem is how to employ a division to assist the government in solving its problems in each conflict area.




Figure 12. Areas of Political Instability within the State.

CHAPTER VI

CAPABILITIES OF THE DIVISION TO ASSIST A FALTERING GOVERNMENT

The division has the mission of "the destruction of enemy military forces and the seizure or domination of critical land areas, their population and resources."¹ This mission is unsuitable for the division to accomplish the task of encouragement of a faltering government in a cold war situation. If the enemy military forces attacked or occupied part of the assisted state, a state of war would exist between the enemy state and the assisted state; thus, to exploit the capabilities of the division, consideration must be given other roles in which the division may be employed. These roles are a show of force, truce enforcement, international police action, legal occupation, restoration of order, and protection of personnel and property.² The division, as a military unit, is capable of military

¹U.S., Department of the Army, FM 61-100, The Division, January 1962, p. 4.

²U.S., Department of the Army, FM 61-100, pp. 4-5.

civic action on a limited scale.

The infantry division is capable of a show of force mission. The U. S. Land Forces in Lebanon were employed as a show of force. This was effective against movement of the Syrian Army into Lebanon. The show of force also prodded General Shihab and the Lebanese Army to take action to reduce the violence between the Christians and the Muslims. The show of force had little, if any, direct effect on stopping the Muslim-Christian conflict. The British flag march in Nairobi had little effect on reducing the Mau Mau terror. The employment of the Soviet units in Budapest was a police action, and a show of force role would have been inadequate. Thus, a show of force role was generally ineffective against irregular forces, but this role was effective against regular forces. The nuclear and non-nuclear firepower of a ROAD division will give adequate cause for a foreign army to reconsider any aggressive attack against the division.

The role of truce enforcement will not be considered as a role for the division to employ in assisting a faltering government. A truce implies a state of war situation, and this study is limited to a cold war situation.

The employment of a division in the role of police action involves the division reinforcement or replacement of the local or national police in an effort to maintain the

established law. The enemy of the laws of the assisted state, such as outlaws and terrorists, becomes the enemy of the infantry division. The enemy may range from a band of renegades to an organized insurgent movement (e.g., Mau Mau terrorists). The military forces in Kenya and Malaya were involved in police actions. The British forces had to isolate the enemy from his means of support, limit the enemy freedom of maneuverability, and then attack the enemy on his own terrain. The British military forces and the governments concerned cooperated and coordinated their efforts in the political and military areas.

A comparison of the ROAD division with the British forces in Kenya and Malaya shows that the ROAD division has the advantages of better communications, firepower, air mobility, and integrity of command. The area concept of communications gives the division better communication reliability, and the battalion teletype capability enables quick dissemination of lengthy instructions within the division. The increased small arms firepower of the ROAD division is a great asset in a police action. The M-14 rifle and the M-79 gun give the rifle squads firepower that has been heretofore unmatched by other type rifle squads. The organic air transport capability of the ROAD division gives flexibility to its means of supply, troop movement, and evacuation which

is invaluable in a decentralized operation such as a police action. The British had organizational unity of command in Kenya and Malaya, but the battalions were brought together on an ad hoc basis. The British forces lacked the integrity of a ROAD division. Commanders above battalion level did not meet their subordinates until they were engaged in the police action. This lack of integrity at the beginning of a police action could have serious consequences. The ROAD division is better organized for a police action than forces that were committed in Lebanon, Kenya, and Malaya because of superior organization and equipment.

The division has the capability of legally occupying the territory of a faltering government, but this capability has not been utilized by any division size force to assist a faltering government. The Soviet Army illegally occupied Hungary with ten divisions and installed a Moscow controlled government in lieu of Imre Nagy's government. It is plausible for a division to occupy a portion of a faltering government's territory and govern that territory, thereby filling a political vacuum until the faltering government is capable of governing the occupied area. This situation could exist over a disputed strip of territory between the assisted state and an intervening state. The extent of this capability has yet to be substantiated by modern history.

The protection of personnel and property is a necessary role of the division when it is employed to assist a faltering government. The seat of government was secured in all four of the historical case studies presented. The American forces in Lebanon secured the presidential palace, the government buildings, and the American Embassy. This action helped prevent a coup d'etat. The American forces also secured the international airport and the dock area in Beirut in order to protect their line of communications. The Soviet's first attack on Budapest was made to protect the communist secret police and the Hungarian Government from the revolutionaries. General Erskine's first major operation in Kenya was to secure Nairobi in Operation ANVIL. This action secured Nairobi and the government from the violence of the Mau Mau. The assassination of Sir Henry Gurey, High Commissioner of Malaya, caused an increase of military forces to provide protection from the communist terrorists. The capability of the ROAD division to provide protection of personnel and property is an essential asset in assisting a faltering government.

The division role in restoring order is a necessary function for assisting a faltering government; it differs from a police action in that the mission is regaining control of the civilian population and not suppressing the

outlaws.³ General Shihab and the Lebanese Army conducted a restoration of order operation after the American forces landed in Lebanon, only to prevent the American forces from assuming the task. "Security and order are preconditions of independence."⁴ The ROAD infantry division is capable of conducting a restoration of order role in assisting a faltering government, as was done by the Lebanese Army.

The roles discussed to this point would aid the faltering government in the one function of security, an area in which the division can give the most assistance. The division can also assist in the governmental functions of social progress and social regulation, but the government must assume the primary role. The Malayan Government accomplished this with its Rural and Industrial Development Authority, and the Kenya Government with its villagization program. If the government could not perform its functions of social progress and regulation, assistance would be required from sources other than the ROAD division. The ROAD division cannot conduct all the functions of national

³U.S., Department of the Army, FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, December 1964, p. 3.

⁴U.S., President, 1953-60 (Eisenhower), Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, 17 August 1959, Vol. II, Annex C, p. 51.

government. Military government assistance or other sources of governmental operations would be required.

In the function of social progress, the ROAD division may aid the faltering government by military civic action. Military civic action is the use of "military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and other areas contributing to economic and social development."⁵

There are ample precedents for the use of the armed services on economic and social projects. In some countries, the armed services possess the largest reservoir of technically qualified and experienced personnel in such fields as civil engineering, communications, weather, air operations, etc.⁶

Military civic action can be a valuable support to a government program of social progress. The technical, educational, and labor capabilities of the ROAD division can be exploited in aiding the faltering government program as long as that effort does not detract from the assigned military mission.

The ROAD division can assist the faltering government in its function of social regulation, the resolution of

⁵U.S., Department of the Army, FM 31-22, US Army Counterinsurgency Forces, November 1963, p. 4.

⁶U.S., President, 1953-60 (Eisenhower), II, 95.

social conflicts. There are four ways in which social conflicts can be solved:

(1) by negotiations and agreement resulting in settlement or adjustment in accord with the will of all the parties; (2) by adjudication and decision in accord with the will, perhaps guided by legal or moral principles, of an outside party; (3) by dictation or decision in accordance with the will of one party to the conflict; and (4) by obsolescence through agreement to disagree which may in time, as new issues arise, sink the conflict into oblivion and result in a settlement according to the will of no one.⁷

The first two solutions have failed in the case of a faltering government. The social and political conflicts have erupted to the violent stage in the intensity of conflict. The division may be able to apply force to the enemy, as the British did in Kenya and Malaya, and solve the conflict by the third solution, unilateral decision. The Russians solved the Hungarian revolt with the third solution. The Lebanon Crisis was solved by the fourth solution, obsolescence. In time, President Shamun gave up his attempt to obtain a second term as president, thus avoiding the ominous possibility of violating the National Covenant. Clausewitz clarified the third solution of dictation against the will of one party: "There are two things which in practice can take the place of the impossibility of further resistance as a motive for making peace. The first is the improbability

⁷Wright, p. 156.

of success, the second, an excessive price to pay for it."⁸ The Mau Mau in Kenya gave up their conflict because success was very improbable after 1956. The Malayan Communists stopped fighting because the price of conflict was excessive. The Communists are still working for the successful overthrow of the Malayan Government, but open conflict could virtually destroy the Malayan Communist party. Destruction of the party is too high a price to pay.

The division is most effective in assisting the faltering government in its function of security, especially in defending the government from threats of foreign military invasion. The division may provide security by means of show of force, international police action, legal occupation, protection of personnel and property, and restoration of order.

The division may assist the government in its function of social regulation by the use of force to compel a party of the conflict to comply with a desired solution, or the division may freeze the conflict by force until social changes make the conflict obsolete.

The division may assist the faltering government in its function of social progress. The division is not

⁸Karl von Clausewitz, On War (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950), p. 20.

organized to assist in this function and its contribution would be limited; however, the division may assist government programs with military civic action. With proper employment a ROAD division can contribute to the encouragement of a faltering government.

CHAPTER VII

A DOCTRINE TO ENCOURAGE A FALTERING GOVERNMENT

The developed doctrine is divided into five general principles. Each principle is stated and discussed.

A. The employment of an infantry division to encourage a faltering government will be accomplished in three phases as follows:

1. Organization and preparation phase
2. Securing the base for operation phase
3. Deployment of forces phase

The purpose of this principle is to prevent a pure reaction approach in assisting a faltering government and to give a direction to the employment of the infantry division. The situation may demand an immediate deployment of forces, and, if so, the commander should revert to the first phase and accomplish the tasks concerned.

The state of emergency was declared in Kenya on 20 October 1952, but the military did not prepare plans or organize any general offensive against the Mau Mau until

April 1954. The military, during the first year and a half of the emergency, reinforced the police in piecemeal fashion, with no general plans for military operations.

The state of emergency in Malaya was declared in June 1948, and it took until June 1950 for the development of the Briggs Plan. The commander of the infantry division must develop a plan of operations as soon as possible and then organize his forces to support that plan.

The securing of a base of operations in the assisted country is essential to facilitate future operations. Battalion landing teams of the Second Provisional Marine Force initially secured airports, dock areas, and Lebanese Government buildings of Beirut in order to protect their line of communications and the faltering government. General Erskine executed Operation ANVIL and cleared Nairobi, his base of operations, from Mau Mau influence. The infantry division and the faltering government must have a secure base of operations in the assisted country.

After the base of operations within the assisted country is secured, the infantry division will conduct offensive operations to assist the faltering government. The division may conduct a show of force, as was done in Lebanon, or it may conduct police action, as was done in the Briggs Plan and in Operation FIRST FLUTE. This phase of operation

is discussed in more detail later.

B. A joint task force will be established in the organization and preparation phase. The task force commander, infantry division commander, will be under operational command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and, during this phase, he will accomplish the following tasks.

1. The task force commander will move his headquarters immediately to the seat of government of the assisted country if physically possible.
2. The task force commander will establish and maintain continuous liaison and coordination with the United States Embassy of the assisted country, the faltering government, and, if possible, the leaders of the dissenting elements of the assisted country. This liaison and coordination is effected to negotiate a political settlement or to gain information and advice for the accomplishment of the second or third phase.
3. The task force commander will determine the faltering government's areas of conflict and the functions that the faltering government cannot perform in those areas.
4. The task force commander will evaluate applicable contingency plans in light of the current political

developments of the assisted country and will develop plans of action for the second and third phases.

The establishment of a joint task force directly under the JCS will give the task force commander a wide latitude of action and flexibility in responding to immediate problems. This command relationship did not exist in the Lebanon Crisis. Ambassador McClintock related his attempt to change the military landings in Lebanon through liaison with a navy captain:

This captain in fact informed the ambassador that he "was subject to the orders of the commander of the Sixth Fleet, who in turn was subject to the orders of ComCinC-SpeCOM, who in turn was subject to the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, who in turn was subject to the orders of the President of the United States." Although this was an accurate description of the naval chain of command, it was in no way responsive to the critical need of the situation which called for a flexible approach, particularly in view of the fact that many of the elements of the Lebanese Army were at that moment preparing to resist the American landing by force.¹

The movement of the task force commander and his staff to the seat of government within the assisted country will enable him and his staff to gain first-hand information and to effect responsive action to critical problems.

The necessity of coordination between the political

¹Robert Mills McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XXCVIII (October 1962), 70.

and the military aspects of the governmental crisis has been evident throughout all four of the historical examples. This coordination and the negotiations may be directed for tactical objectives or for political objectives. Negotiations permitted the marines to occupy the dock areas of Beirut, and negotiations aided the British in ending the Mau Mau terror. The task force commander must be willing to negotiate with all parties to the conflict. The victor and the vanquished attitude on the part of the task force commander may push the cold war crisis into a general war and leave no room for political accommodation. This attitude on the part of the Soviet commanders precipitated the Hungarian Revolution.

The task force commander should unify the effort of the information gathering and intelligence processing agencies of the task force, the assisted government, the American Embassy, and any other agencies available. The commander will give direction to the intelligence effort as Generals Erskine and Templer did in Kenya and Malaya. This intelligence production, both political and military, is absolutely necessary or the commander will be operating in a vacuum and will be attacking blindly.

The task force commander, the American ambassador, and representatives of the faltering government will make a

political estimate to determine the areas of conflict causing the governmental instability and the functions in those areas of conflict in which the government cannot perform. The task force commander will have to rely heavily on the American ambassador and the faltering government in arriving at the conclusions of this estimate. The accuracy of the estimate depends on the amount of intelligence available and the political maturity of the persons making the estimate.

After the causes of the conflict have been defined, a general plan of action is developed. This plan is a joint political and military plan. Basically, the faltering government will execute the plan for social progress and regulation and the task force will execute the plan for maintaining security. There should be no dichotomy of action between the task force and the faltering government, but coordination must be assured by leadership and liaison. Certainly the faltering government and the task force can greatly assist and absolutely should aid each other in the functions assigned. The Briggs Plan in Malaya is a fine example of joint military-political effort. This joint plan must be reviewed and revised as new developments occur. This plan will be the basis of action for stabilizing the faltering government.

C. A base of operations for the task force and the

faltering government will be secured during the second phase. During this phase, the task force commander will accomplish the following tasks:

1. Secure routes of communications from the zone of interior to the seat of government of the faltering government.
2. Secure the seat of government of the assisted country.
3. Secure the task force base of operations.

If the crisis threatens the physical existence of the government of the assisted country, phases one and two will probably have to be accomplished concurrently even though the risk of adding to the confusion of the employment of the task force is increased. The security of the faltering government is obviously essential if it is to gain stability and further regain its functions of government. Security of the task force and routes of communications is basic to all military operations and, therefore, does not warrant further discussion.

D. The task force will deploy to aid the functions of the faltering government as follows.

1. The task force will assist the faltering government primarily in its function of security and may temporarily assume responsibility for this function.

- a. The task force will give first priority to providing security from international conflict and, depending on the severity of the conflict, it will be employed in the role of show of force, protection of personnel and property, police action, or legal occupation.
 - b. The task force will provide security in domestic conflict by protection of personnel and property, restoration of order, or legal occupation.
 - c. The task force will provide security in the sovereignty conflict area by protection of personnel and property, police action, and legal occupation.
 - d. The task force employed in the police action role will accomplish the following tasks:
 - (1) Determine the localities of conflict.
 - (2) Identify the localities of conflict.
 - (3) Isolate the outlaws from the remainder of the population.
 - (4) Occupy the localities of conflict.
 - (5) Conduct offensive operations to destroy the outlaws.
2. The task force will assist the faltering government in the function of social regulation with dictation

by force or by freezing the conflict until the causes of conflict are obsolete.

3. The task force will assist the faltering government in its function of social progress by military civic action, but the faltering government or a foreign economic or social agency will have to execute the major portion of the program for social progress.

The task force can assist the faltering government primarily in accomplishing the function of security. The police, home guard, and army of the faltering government should be committed to actions that are seen and respected by the majority of the population of the assisted country. Protection of life and property and courteous assistance to the public are actions that put the government in a favorable light. The task force should be employed against foreign powers or outlaws who give very little hope of pledging their allegiance to the assisted country. These hard core outlaws or foreign agents leave little recourse other than their destruction or neutralization by force.

The task force should be committed only to the extent necessary to aid the faltering government. The show of force is the least involved commitment; legal occupation is the most involved. If the task force assumes more responsibility for the functions of government than is necessary,

the faltering government may become unduly dependent on the task force. This will cause a further weakening of the government.

When the task force is involved in a police action, it is committed to offensive action. The task force will seek out and capture the outlaw elements of the assisted country. If the task force is committed to a police action, a long term operation such as in Malaya and Kenya can be expected. Only if the task force commander is left no other alternative should he consider committing his forces to a role of police action or legal occupation. Large groups of political reactionaries or radicals within the assisted country may force the commander to adopt a police action or legal occupation role.

The task force can assist a faltering government in its function of social regulation by reinforcing governmental decisions. The dissenters to social regulation by the government will have to consider the fact that the task force may make their success, by further resistance, impossible or the employment of the task force may require the dissenters to pay an excessive price. Thus, the amount of open dissension is lowered and the government can regain control of the political situation.

The task force is limited in its ability to assist

the government in a program of social progress. The infantry division is poorly organized for civic action because of its limited resources in technical services and its limited experience in agriculture, mining, fishing, education, and basic industries. If assistance is required by the faltering government to conduct an extensive program, it would be more efficient to import social and economic agencies to conduct the program.

E. As the faltering government achieves the capability to execute its functions in different areas, the task force will relinquish control of these functions.

The government must obtain and maintain control of its functions if it is to become stable. If the government cannot obtain or keep this control because of lack of political power, the government has faltered and must be semidependent on the task force. That situation is beyond the scope of this study since it was assumed that the faltering government had the potential of achieving stability with assistance.

The gradual return of governmental functions to the assisted country enables the government to absorb the new functions in stride and narrows the area requiring military support by foreign forces. The British in Malaya returned the "Black" areas to the Malayan Government as soon as these

areas were declared "White." This return resulted in the Malayan Government assuming more control of its governmental functions and also in the reduction of requirements for the British military forces. The final goal of the task force is the complete transfer of governmental functions to the assisted country.

In conclusion, the doctrine for the encouragement of a faltering government is developed to assist the commander and staff of a ROAD infantry division prior to the commitment of the division in the assisted country. This doctrine divides the employment of the division into three phases. In the first phase the division commander and his staff establish the division command post in the assisted country, establish and maintain liaison with the faltering government and the United States ambassador, determine the faltering government's areas of conflict, and develop plans of action for the second and third phases. During the second phase the division commander secures his route of communications, the assisted country's seat of government, and his division's base of operations. In the third phase the division is committed to assist the faltering government in regaining control of functions it has lost. As the government regains the power to control its functions, the division will relinquish the control of these functions. The doctrine is not

developed to replace established military doctrine but to be an addendum to the established doctrine and to extend the effectiveness of the infantry division in a cold war situation. This is the first known attempt to develop a doctrine to encourage a faltering government by the employment of an infantry division; therefore, the doctrine is merely a beginning, not a finality.


CHAPTER VIII

A WAR GAME OF THE DOCTRINE

General Situation

This war game is conducted to test in a hypothetical arena the doctrine developed through an analysis of real world arenas. The applicatory study of the doctrine produces further insights which give validity and credibility to the doctrine. A mythical state is created along the west coast of the Balkan Peninsula along the Greek and Yugoslav border. The imaginary state is named Adriatica as it has a coastline along the Adriatic Sea. Adriatica has a fictitious population and a faltering government, but to add reality to the situation the state has a defined territory (see Figure 13).

Adriatica did not become an independent state until the year 1912 when, by means of a general uprising, it successfully revolted against the domination of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had ruled over Adriatica from 1444 to 1912 and had kept its people in a state of oppression. The people of Adriatica had revolted unsuccessfully against



Turkish rule in 1879, 1910, and 1911. Turkish oppression was the binding ingredient of the rising tide of nationalism within Adriatica. The successful revolution of 1912 against the declining Ottoman Empire gave birth to the new state.

The Serbs and the Montenegrins to the north of Adriatica pressed their old territorial claims on the northern prefectures of Adriatica. After three years of political conflict and border clashes, the Serbs and Montenegrins occupied the northern prefectures in the name of pan-Slavism. The occupation was followed by bitter fighting until the Austro-Bulgarian armies seized the northern prefectures from the combatants. With the defeat of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria during World War I, Adriatica regained control of the northern prefectures. The newly formed Yugoslav nation continued the demands for Slavic unification with mountain skirmishes in northern Adriatica. Suddenly, in November 1921, the Yugoslavs attacked Adriatica, but British intervention halted the attack and restored the original frontier.

Border clashes with Yugoslavia continued until German conquest of the Balkans in April 1941. Nationalism of Adriatica remained alive with underground resistance movements against the Germans. In 1945 Adriatica was liberated by the Soviet Army but did not embrace communism as its arch enemy, Yugoslavia, had done. Adriatica, along with Greece,

resisted communist infiltration and, with United States aid, defeated the organized communist guerrilla movement within its border in 1949. Because of this defeat, communism remained an effective movement only among the Slavic tribes in northern Adriatica.

The estimated 1,400,000 population of Adriatica is divided basically into three ethnic groups: Illyrians, 38%; Ghegs, 23%; and Tosks, 30%. The Illyrians are of Latin stock and were the original settlers in central Adriatica. They are generally Roman Catholic and look to Italy and western Europe for their cultural values. As an ethnic group, the Illyrians favor occupations in the fields of commerce and trade. The majority of the businesses and marine industries in Adriatica are operated by the Illyrians.

The Ghegs are of Slavic stock which invaded Adriatica in the seventh century. The Ghegs are Greek Orthodox in religion and look to eastern Europe for their cultural values. They occupy the northern mountain portion of Adriatica, have avoided social relationships with other groups, and are extremely clannish and introverted. The Ghegs are almost exclusively shepherders and have developed a fierce, independent, warrior-like attitude.

The Tosks are of Turkish stock. They followed the Turkish conquerors of the 15th century to Adriatica. The

Tosks are of the Muslim faith and the Turkish culture. They occupied the southern portion of Adriatica initially and then tended to mix with the Illyrians during the succeeding centuries. The Tosks are peasant farmers basically although some of them have moved to the towns and cities to find new jobs in commerce and industries.

The economic life of the nation is primarily concerned with agricultural pursuits and stock raising. Agricultural methods are largely primitive. About 70% of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits. About 9% of the land is tilled, 24% in forests or pastures, the remaining 67% is worthless scrub woodland, wooded mountain slopes, or other unproductive areas. Farm products include grain, olives, and tobacco. In the mountainous area livestock raising is the most important agricultural activity. . . . [Adriatica] is relatively rich in metallic and non-metallic minerals but for the most part is relatively undeveloped.¹

The government of Adriatica was established by its national constitution of 1912. A unitary government was formed with ten prefectures as its subordinate administrative arm (see Figure 13). Each prefecture sends ten delegates to the national legislature, the House of Hundred. The House elects the president and his cabinet. The constitution was drawn up by the National Freedom party, consisting primarily of Illyrians who fought the Turks for independence. The constitution permitted no persons of Turkish

¹U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Area Study 4, Balkans, 1964, p. 6.

ancestry to hold any positions in the House of Hundred. In 1916 the Tosks formed the Agrarian party to unite themselves against the invasion of the Slavs and to protest the ownership of their farms. By 1920 the Agrarian party was officially recognized by the government because of its aid against the Slavs. In 1922, by constitutional amendment, the Agrarian party was permitted to occupy a maximum of ten seats in the House of Hundred.

A Socialist party was formed in Tirana in 1928 and was recognized by the government a year later. Because of the economic undevelopment of Adriatica, the Socialists were able to gain one seat in the House during the 1930's.

The Ghegs in the three northern prefectures of Shkoder, Kukes, and Diber organized a Slavic Union party in 1935. This party was not recognized until 1941, when the Ghegs joined the Illyrians and the Tosks in resisting the German occupation.

The Adriatica Communist party was recognized in 1946, but, because of the communist guerrilla outbreak of 1948 and 1949, the party was outlawed. The Communists then moved to infiltrate the Slavic Union party.

During the communist guerrilla outbreak, the Agrarian party worked for the constitutional change eliminating the limit on the number of delegates to the House who were

of Turkish ancestry. In April of 1950 a constitutional amendment was passed permitting any person, regardless of ancestry, to be a delegate to the House. Because of an arrangement of boundaries of voting districts and other administrative actions, the Agrarian party gained only a few seats in the House. The Agrarian party strove for rural improvements in communications, education, and agricultural assistance for southern Adriatica, but due to its lack of delegates in the House it achieved very few of its goals.

The Slavic Union party, consisting mainly of the Ghegs, could not gain its share of power in the House because of a division within the party itself. The conservative wing of the party desired little assistance from the national government and wanted to be left alone. The liberal wing wanted a near-autonomous government of the three northern prefectures of Shkoder, Kukes, and Diber. The growing communist element of the Slavic Union party wanted union of the three northern prefectures with Yugoslavia.

In the last national election the National Freedom party won 57 seats in the House. It controlled the legislature, the cabinet, and the governmental agencies. Its goals were representation of the Illyrian commerce interests and maintaining the national union of Adriatica. The Agrarian party held 17 seats; the Slavic Union party held 16 seats;

and the Socialist party held the remaining 10 seats.

The army of Adriatica consists of ten battalions of infantry and ten batteries of artillery. Each prefecture recruits or drafts personnel for one battalion and one battery. These units usually stay in their prefectures except in time of war or in emergencies. The navy has 25 light naval craft and one destroyer with destroyer escort. The navy's primary function is coast guard duty. The air force has eight F-86 jet fighters and four C-47 transports. The main mission of the air force is patrolling the mountains along the borders.

Adriatica "has an area of 28,700 kilometers. It is long and narrow, running about 338 kilometers from north to south and an average of 97 kilometers from east to west."²

[The main topographical features of Adriatica] are the low, marshy coast, heavily indented and crossed by several rivers, and the rugged mountain ranges. It is primarily a mountainous country with 70% of the country at elevations above 300 meters. About a third of its area lies between 1,000 and 2,000 meters above sea level, with some peaks reaching above 2,750 meters.³

Adriatica has 200 kilometers of standard gage railroad tracks which are located primarily in the central

²U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Area Study 4, p. 5.

³U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Area Study 4, p. 5.

portion of the nation. Tirana, the nation's capital, has the only modern airfield for large aircraft in the nation, and Durres is the only seaport that can dock ocean going vessels.

Situation Leading to the Crisis

During the 1950's and early 1960's, the Tosks, through their Agrarian party, tried to gain equal representation in the House of Hundred and improve the social and economic conditions in southern Adriatica. In 1955 the Agrarian party attempted to conduct a general strike to gain its political objectives, but the strike failed due to lack of support in northern Adriatica. In 1958 a protest march was conducted from Durazzo to Tirana to gain support for the Tosks. The infantry battalion in the prefecture of Tirana broke up the marchers five kilometers east of the city of Tirana. In the national elections of 1960, the government building in the city of Berat was burned down by a violent mob that was infuriated by the voting procedures of the government. Aldo Terpan, leader of the Agrarian party, proclaimed that if the voting procedures were not revised by 1964 national elections, no Tosk would pay taxes, serve in the military, or perform any other civic duties. He further predicted that the next president of Adriatica would be a

Tosk, and that 60% of the national budget from 1965 to 1968 would be spent for social and economic improvement in southern Adriatica. Terpan and his party set the year 1964 as the year of first-class citizenship for the Tosks.

President Kolis Gracen, president of Adriatica 1960-1964, replied to Terpan and the Agrarian party that the democratic processes Adriatica earned by the Revolution of 1912 would not be given up to a dictator or to any minority group. He further stated that any citizen who failed to perform his civic responsibilities would be dealt with harshly.

Meanwhile, the Slavic Union party had made little progress in efforts toward unity within its party. During the decade of the 1950's, the Communists were able to infiltrate the party with the assistance of the Yugoslav communist government. By 1959, Petro Curkaj, a Communist, had become the leader of the liberal wing of the Slavic Union party. The liberal wing changed its goal of obtaining near-autonomous government for the three northern prefectures to a goal of uniting the Ghegs with their brother Slavs in communist Yugoslavia.

Miklai Dobrune, the elderly leader of the conservative wing in the Slavic Union party, resisted the efforts of Curkaj and his liberal wing in their attempt to unite with

Yugoslavia. Dobrunë and his followers held that the Ghegs should follow their old traditions of family and clan rule and avoid any national governmental regulation. Dobrunë fought public schooling and road construction in the northern prefectures. In June of 1962 Dobrunë and 53 of his followers were demonstrating against a new road construction along the Drin Valley. A charge of TNT placed for clearing the roadway was prematurely detonated, and Dobrunë and 34 of his demonstrating followers were killed by the explosion.

Curkaj and his communist followers immediately charged that this explosion was a government plot to destroy the Gheg way of life and to make the Ghegs slaves of the Illyrians. He called for unification of the Ghegs under his leadership and for a new program to combat the tyranny of the Illyrian government.



In August of 1962 Curkaj became the political leader of both wings of the Slavic Union party and, in effect, united the Ghegs. After five months of political debate in the House of Hundred and failure to achieve any of his goals, Curkaj announced that the Ghegs would form a new government in the northern prefectures and he withdrew his party from Tirana. Curkaj and his followers withdrew to the mountains in northern Kukes and set up his new revolutionary government. The three Gheg infantry battalions of the northern

prefectures joined Curkaj and his new government.

Because of the severe climate in the mountains of Kukes, President Gracen waited until the spring of 1963 to send five battalions of infantry into Kukes. The battalions combed the mountains during that summer and fall, but Curkaj, his government, and his army had moved into Yugoslavia. Intelligence reports indicated that Curkaj had five battalions of infantry being equipped and trained by the Yugoslav Army.

On May Day of 1964 a Gheg column of three infantry battalions left Titograd, crossed the Yugoslav-Adriatica border, seized the city of Shkoder in Shkoder Prefecture, and continued south. On the same day, two Gheg infantry battalions departed Prizren, Yugoslavia, crossed the border into Adriatica along the Drin-i-bardhe River, and seized the city of Kukes. President Gracen ordered five of his seven infantry battalions to halt these Gheg advances at the Mat River. (See Figure 14.) It took the Gheg battalions until 30 June 1964 to clear Shkoder and Kukes Prefectures. The Adriatica Air Force was destroyed by Yugoslav aircraft posing as the air force of the Gheg.


On 1 July President Gracen asked the United States to send military forces to assist the government of Adriatica in regaining control of its territory and population.



On 2 July the United States replied that it would send a division size task force to assist Adriatica.

The 20th Infantry Division, located at Fort Dix, New Jersey, was alerted to depart the United States by ship in three increments on the 7th, 9th, and 11th of July. Arrival in Durres, Adriatica, would be on the 19th, 21st, and 23d of July. The 91st Tactical Fighter Wing (minus two squadrons) consisting of 36 F-104 fighter aircraft would arrive at Tirana National Airport on 19 July, and the commander of the joint task force would assume operational command of the squadron at that time. Elements of the Sixth Fleet would patrol the coastline of Adriatica and support the joint task force on a request basis. The 417th Transportation Battalion (four truck companies) and the 115th Logistical Command (type B) were attached to the joint task force. (See Figure 15.)

Major General Smith, commanding general of the 20th Infantry Division and of the Adriatic Joint Task Force, received the following guidance from the JCS: "The Adriatic Joint Task Force will assist the government of Adriatica in its maintenance of sovereignty and integrity over the population and territory of Adriatica. This mission is to be accomplished with a minimum of violence. The Joint Task Force Commander will establish rapport with the government



LEGEND

- S — S — Strategic Direction.
- X — X — Operational Control.
- - - - - Support.

Figure 15. Adriatic Joint Task Force Organization.

of Adriatica and the United States Ambassador to Adriatica for unity of action in resolving the crisis. Any disagreement between the above stated parties will be referred directly to the JCS."

Application of Doctrine (Phase I)

On 2 July General Smith planned to conduct the task force operations in three phases: the first phase, organization and preparation, would be conducted from 2 to 19 July; the second phase, securing the base of operations, would be conducted from 19 to 21 July; and the third phase, deployment of forces, would be conducted 19 July until the end of the crisis.

General Smith and his division headquarters departed by aircraft for Tirana on 3 July. He left his senior assistant division commander and a small portion of the division staff to control the overseas movement of the 20th Infantry Division. General Smith and his staff arrived in Tirana on 4 July and established the headquarters of the Adriatic Joint Task Force in a hotel near the American Embassy. A conference with President Gracen and U. S. Ambassador Sloan was scheduled for the morning of 5 July at the presidential palace.

President Gracen met with Ambassador Sloan and

General Smith as scheduled. The President expressed appreciation for the assistance of the American Government. He then proposed that the task force be under command of the Adriatica Land Army commanding general and that a general offensive be conducted to destroy Gheg resistance in the northern prefectures, after which the Adriatic Army would be committed to put down any civil disturbances by the Tosks in the southern prefectures.

Ambassador Sloan responded that he did not think it wise to commit U. S. forces or Adriatica military forces against the Ghegs or the Tosks, and that the military should be committed to defensive operations only and should encourage negotiations for a political settlement.

Ambassador Sloan's statement infuriated President Gracen. He stated that the Ghegs and the Tosks must be subdued as threats to the government, that only then would the government consider their grievances, and that any other approach was unacceptable. The President then stormed out of the meeting.

General Smith realized that phase III of his task force operation could not be planned until President Gracen and he had developed a common political basis for the employment of military forces. General Smith and his staff deferred planning phase III and completed the plans for


phase II. The plans for phase II called for the 1st Brigade, consisting of the 1/66 Inf Bn, 1/67 Inf Bn, 1/68 Inf Bn, 1/1 Armor Bn, 1/45 Arty Bn, 4441st Transportation Co (Lt Trk) and Co A, 20th Eng Bn to land at the port of Durres on 19 July. The 1/21 Cav Sqdn and advanced elements of the 115th Logistical Command would be attached to the 1st Brigade for the sea movement, but upon arrival at Durres they would revert to task force control. The 1st Brigade would then accomplish the mission of securing the port of Durres, the national airport of Tirana, and government buildings in Tirana. The 1/21 Cav Sqdn would have a screening mission 25 kilometers north of Tirana and Durres, and the advanced elements of the 115th Logistical Command would establish logistical operations in Durres.

During the night of 5 July, Aldo Terpan and his Agrarian party (the Tosks) executed their plan to gain equal representation. Terpan realized that President Gracen's bargaining power was greatly weakened by the Gheg revolt. He directed the three Tosk battalions then employed in Diber Prefecture to return to their own prefectures of Vlore, Gjirokaster, and Korce and to await further instructions. He then informed President Gracen that when the Tosks became first-class citizens they would become first-class soldiers of Adriatica.

The Ghegs took advantage of the retirement of the three Tosk battalions, and on the morning of 6 July they advanced into Diber Prefecture. It was estimated that by 9 July Diber would be completely occupied by the Gheg forces. President Gracen ordered the two remaining battalions at Tirana and Berat to move to the Diber border and halt the advance of the Gheg forces (see Figure 16). Realizing that the Ghegs would be only twenty kilometers northeast of Tirana and that the Tosks were in a belligerent mood, President Gracen summoned Ambassador Sloan and General Smith to his palace.

President Gracen explained the urgency for the U. S. forces to assist his government immediately and that the planned arrival of U. S. forces on 19 July was too late. General Smith replied that possibly the first increment could be flown into Tirana by 9 July, but that a political agreement for the employment of the task force must be achieved first. An agreement was reached after three hours of negotiations. General Smith sent a request to the JCS that the first increment be airlifted to Tirana on an emergency basis. This request was approved eight hours later. The estimated arrival time of the first increment in Tirana was 1500 on 9 July.

The political agreement between President Gracen and



Ambassador Sloan established the following basis of operations:

1. In the domestic conflict between the Tosks and the government of Adriatica, the United States will provide security and will assist in the function of social progress and social regulation.
2. In the domestic conflict between the Ghegs and the government of Adriatica, the United States will provide security and will assist in the function of social regulation.
3. In the international conflict between Yugoslavia and Adriatica, the United States will provide security.
4. The Commanding General, Adriatic Joint Task Force, in coordination with the Commanding General, Adriatica Land Army, will develop a unified plan of military operations.
5. Liaison officers between forces of the United States and Adriatica will be exchanged.
6. A combined intelligence agency will be established by the government of Adriatica and the Adriatic Joint Task Force.
7. United States military forces will protect the

prefectures of Tirana, Durres, and Elbasan from any invasion or internal acts of violence.

8. United States military forces will be committed to prevent any military intervention in Adriatica by a foreign state.
9. United States military forces will assist in training military forces in Adriatica.
10. The United States will aid the government of Adriatica in a program of economic and social aid with financial and personnel assistance.
11. The government of Adriatica will reform its political process so as to make its government more acceptable to the Tosk population.
12. The government of Adriatica will negotiate with the Tosks to achieve a compromise solution and will not use force to achieve the solution.
13. The government of Adriatica will seek a political settlement with the Ghegs that is acceptable to them upon the defeat of their military forces.

On 8 July a military conference was held with General Dukat, Commanding General, Adriatica Land Army, and his staff to develop a plan of military operations based on the political agreement of 7 July. General Dukat informed General Smith that he felt the Ghegs would need two weeks to

reposition their forces for an attack on Tirana. He suggested that the 20th Infantry Division attack on 24 July from Kruje to Peshkope and cut off the three Gheg battalions in southern Diber Prefecture. The Adriatica Land Army could then defeat the Ghegs in detail. After discussion, this plan was dropped because of the rugged terrain involved and the possibility of a Tosk uprising in southern Adriatica. After further discussion, it was finally decided to conduct the operation in three campaigns as follows:

1. The Tirana-Elbasan Defense Campaign, 9 July 1964 to 21 April 1965. The Adriatica Land Army will defend the Mat riverline and the Mal-i-Skanderbeut mountain range. The Adriatic Joint Task Force will provide a reserve for this defense and train new units for the Adriatica Land Army. The task force will be responsible for restoration of order in central and southern Adriatica.
2. The 1965 Spring Offensive Campaign, 22 April to 30 May 1965. The Adriatica Land Army will destroy the Gheg military forces and restore the original borders of Adriatica. The Adriatic Joint Task Force will be responsible for countering any armed intervention from any foreign state.

3. The Communist Guerrilla Campaign, 30 May 1965
until successful conclusion. The Adriatica Land Army will seek out and destroy the remnant forces of the Gheg army and the communist political organizations.

Generals Smith and Dukat reasoned that they could not conduct an offensive until the Tosk civil dispute had been settled and the land army had a three-to-one superiority over the Gheg military forces. Ambassador Sloan agreed to act as a mediator for the settlement of the dispute between President Gracen and Aldo Terpan, leader of the Tosks. If this dispute could be resolved, the land army would regain the three Tosk battalions and could concentrate on the communist threat to the north. During this campaign the three northern prefectures would be sealed off from the seven remaining prefectures to help stop the spread of communism. The Adriatica Land Army required strengthening to twenty battalions of infantry plus combat support and combat service support units. Since the land army was fully committed, the joint task force would help to train 13 new infantry battalions plus their supporting units. If the Gheg military forces should break through the defense line, the joint task force would be committed to save the government of Adriatica. A great deal had to be accomplished dur-

ing the ten months of this campaign, but the most critical problem was the solution of the civil dispute with the Tosks.

The spring offensive was scheduled for 22 April 1965, when most of the mountain roads and trails would be clear of snow and the rivers would no longer be swollen from the melted snow. The final objective of this campaign was the sealing off of the Gheg population from the influence of communist Yugoslavia by securing the borders of Adriatica. Without direct assistance from a foreign source, the Ghegs would have to resort to guerrilla warfare; however, the joint task force would continue to be prepared to counter any foreign military intervention. The government of Adriatica could assume its functions over the prefectures as they were uncovered. Advance planning and preparation were necessary to prevent communist infiltration and reorganization in local government circles. The big task of the government was winning the popular support of the Ghegs after they had been under communist doctination.



The communist guerrilla campaign would be conducted after the border was sealed. The military forces of Adriatica would separate the Ghegs from the Communists and attack only the Communists while building up popular support from the Ghegs. The combined intelligence organization, formed a year earlier, would be providing valuable assistance in

locating and separating the Communists from the Ghegs. The communist guerrillas would have the security of the mountainous terrain of the northern prefectures, and this campaign would be of a long duration. This campaign would end when the Gheg no longer accepted communism and Yugoslavia ceased to give direct aid to the Communists of Adriatica.

Application of the Doctrine (Phase II)

The first flight of the first increment of the Adriatic Joint Task Force landed at the national airport in Tirana at 1330 on 9 July. Five and a half hours later all of the 1st Brigade was in Tirana. The brigade commander employed the 1st Battalion of the 66th Infantry two kilometers northeast of Durres to protect the seaport (see Figure 17). The 1st Battalion of the 67th Infantry was employed at Vorre to block the valley approach from Shkoder to Tirana. The 1st Battalion of the 68th Infantry was employed one kilometer north of Tirana to protect the capitol. The 1st Squadron of the 23d Cavalry (minus its tanks) was given a screening mission ten kilometers southeast of Tirana. The advanced elements of the 115th Logistical Command moved to the port of Durres to establish a logistical base.

Ambassador Sloan requested funds and personnel from the State Department to set up a combined agency with the



government of Adriatica. This agency was called the Adriatica Economic and Social Development Agency (AESDA). It would develop a program for the Tosks first and then one for the Ghegs. Ambassador Sloan hoped this would help satisfy part of Terpan's demands for the Tosks.

A conference was held in Berat from 10 to 15 July to negotiate the dispute between the Tosks and the government of Adriatica. Ambassador Sloan started the conference by stating that the United States forces would prevent Tusk forces and government forces from entering into any violent conflict with each other. This meant that the dispute would have to be settled peaceably among themselves or the United States would be forced to dictate a solution for them. After five days of negotiations, it was agreed that the Tosks would temporarily rejoin the government in its war with the Ghegs. Aldo Terpan stated that the Tosks would revolt after the next election if the Agrarian party did not receive its commensurate share of seats in the House of Hundred and its share of positions in the government. President Gracen assured Terpan that the Tosks would have their share of government responsibility if they assisted him in fighting the Communists.

The government of Adriatica started a propaganda campaign to sell the idea that the government existed to

serve the social needs of the Illyrians, the Tosks, and the Ghegs. The government considered only the Communists as its enemy and asked all Illyrians, Tosks, and Ghegs to unite as Adriaticans and drive the Communists from their borders as they had done in 1949. The aims of the Adriatica Economic and Social Development Agency were widely publicized, as was the economic and military assistance to be given by the United States.

The 2d Brigade arrived at Durres on 21 July, as scheduled. The 2d Brigade consisted of the 1/69 Infantry, 1/70 Infantry, 1/2 Armor, 1/46 Artillery, and Company B of the 20th Engineer Battalion. Major elements of the 115th Logistical Command, 417th Transportation Battalion, division troops, and support command arrived with the 2d Brigade. The 2d Brigade moved to Elbasan as the Adriatic Joint Task Force reserve with priority of commitment in northeastern Elbasan Prefecture and then in northern Tirana Prefecture. The 115th Logistical Command set up logistical operations in the port of Durres. The support command and the 417th Transportation Battalion set up a base of operations one kilometer south of Tirana.

The 3d Brigade arrived at Durres on 23 July with the remainder of the joint task force. The 3d Brigade consisted of the 1/71 Infantry, 1/72 Infantry, 1/73 Infantry,

1/1 Armor Battalion, 1/47 Artillery, and Company C of the 20th Engineer Battalion. The brigade was moved to Berat and was given two missions. The first mission was a show of force role to demonstrate to the Tosks that the United States military forces would back up Ambassador Sloan's statement of 10 July. The second mission was to provide military assistance to organize and train 13 new infantry battalions that would be employed in the 1965 spring offensive. The 3d Brigade also supplemented the program of the Adriatica Economic and Social Development Agency with its own program of civic action.

Application of the Doctrine (Phase III)

Yugoslavia and the communist nations proclaimed that the United States was intervening in the internal affairs of Adriatica and suppressing the freedom-loving Gheg tribes. The United States took the position that U. S. forces would not be committed against the Ghegs unless they advanced south of their three northern prefectures or unless a foreign military force intervened against Adriatica. A direct warning was given to Yugoslavia against sending military forces into Adriatica.

The three Tosk infantry battalions rejoined the Adriatica Land Army on 29 July. These battalions balanced

the government, and Gheg forces and the front became stabilized. The military conflict was reduced to patrol action. By 1 September the 3d Brigade was in the process of training eight infantry battalions.

In the national elections of November 1964, the Agrarian party was able to gain 14 seats in the House. President Gracen retained the presidency and offered the cabinet position Minister of the Interior to Aldo Terpan. Terpan accepted the position and stated that he felt the need for violence by the Tosks was no longer necessary because of the political and economic progress made by the Agrarian party.


By 1 January 1965 the 3d Brigade was in the process of organizing and training nine infantry battalions. Four battalions had completed training and joined the Adriatica Land Army. An intelligence net had been established in the northern prefectures and in Yugoslavia. There were indications of Gheg dissatisfaction with the Communists. Because of the severe winter climate in the mountains, military activity along the front had virtually ceased.

Plans were finalized during the winter months for the spring offensive. The land army planned to defeat the Gheg military forces by two major penetrations and exploitation on two axes, the Adriatic coastal plain and the

Drin-i-zi valley, to seize the six main border passes (see Figure 18). If Yugoslav military forces intervened, the Adriatic Joint Task Force would be committed.

On 10 April the Yugoslav Army moved two divisions to Titograd and employed them along the border of Adriatica. In response, the 3d Brigade, which had completed its training mission by 1 April 1965, was moved from Berat to Kruje, Tirana Prefecture. The 1/48 Artillery Battalion was also attached to the 3d Brigade. The 2d Brigade was given the mission of following the land army attack up the Drin-i-zi valley, and the 3d Brigade would follow the land army attack up the Adriatic coastal plain. Both brigades would be in position to stop any intervention by the Yugoslav Army. The 1st Brigade was to remain in task force reserve in the Tirana-Durres area.

The spring offensive started on 21 April 1965. The land army successfully penetrated the Gheg defenses in Drin-i-zi valley and were in the exploitation phase by 23 April. The land army attack along the Adriatic coastal plain met with initial defeat and the attack was postponed until 25 April. The land army then managed to envelop the east flank of the Gheg defensive positions at the Mat River, and by 27 April the land army was in the exploitation phase. The Gheg military forces were completely ineffective by



0 20 40 60 Kilometers

Figure 18. Axes of Advance into Ghagshid Territories.

30 April. On 3 May the first objective of the spring offensive was seized along the Yugoslav border near the Adriatic coastline. By 27 May all the objectives were secured, and the 2d and 3d Brigades reinforced the land army along the border passes. The Ghegs were isolated from direct Yugoslav aid.

The Communists, along with the remnants of the Gheg military forces, withdrew to the mountain areas of the three northern prefectures and decentralized into bands of guerrilla forces. The communist guerrillas began an active campaign of harassing and raiding government forces located in the valleys of the northern prefectures. Petro Curkaj made public his vow to carry the Gheg fight for freedom against the tyranny of Tirana and Washington.

The land forces of Adriatica began their third campaign, the communist guerrilla campaign, on 30 May 1965. The land forces occupied Shkoder, Kukes, and Diber Prefectures with five infantry battalions in each prefecture. Loyal Ghegs were organized into home guard units to defend the valleys from communist guerrilla attacks. This left the land forces free to occupy the mountain areas and attack the Communists on their own terrain.

The Adriatic Joint Task Force occupied the valley approaches from Yugoslavia into Adriatica. The 1st Brigade

moved from Tirana and Durres areas to Shengjin, Shkoder Prefecture, as the joint task force reserve. The 2d Brigade occupied the three main valley approaches in Kukes Prefecture and the 3d Brigade did the same in Shkoder Prefecture. The joint task force had the mission of preventing Yugoslav intervention and illegal border crossings.

The Adriatica Economic and Social Development Agency (AESDA) followed the land army in its occupation of the northern prefectures and began its task of winning the minds and hearts of the Ghegs to the state of Adriatica. A Gheg Union party was formed to supplant the old Slavic Union party and it was given twenty seats in the House of Hundred until the 1968 national election. The AESDA registered all persons in the northern prefectures and rationed food to the Ghegs because of a food shortage. This rationing prevented food from falling into communist hands.

The terrain above 3,000 feet sea level in the northern prefectures was declared off limits and was occupied by the land army. Any person found above this altitude was seized as a communist guerrilla. Raids and spot checks were made in areas below this altitude in locations where intelligence indicated guerrilla activity.

Yugoslav intervention activities ceased during the summer of 1965, and the 2d and 3d Brigades were withdrawn

from their border missions. The Adriatic Joint Task Force was terminated as an organization in the fall of 1965, and the 20th Infantry Division returned to the United States. The government of Adriatica was capable of controlling its area of conflicts in all of its functions.

Conclusions

The employment of the 20th Infantry Division as part of a joint task force was accomplished in three phases to assist the faltering government of Adriatica. This phasing gave direction and finite purpose to the joint task force within a broad frame of reference. The commander still had to make decisions and compromises, but he had a guide to enable him to plan for the future and not merely to react to immediate situations. The crisis of Lebanon, the revolt of Hungary, and the first year of the emergencies in Kenya and Malaya are prime examples of military reaction without direction and finite purpose.

In phase I, the organization and preparation phase, General Smith moved to Tirana almost immediately to provide effective planning and control in the area of conflict. Ambassador Sloan did not have the problems of effective coordination with the military that Ambassador McClintock had in Beirut on 15 July 1958. General Smith was able to

gain a political and a military agreement for the employment of his forces before they were actually employed. Initially, President Gracen's and General Smith's concepts of employment of forces were not in agreement. An agreement had to be negotiated prior to the arrival of forces. The early arrival of General Smith and his staff enabled them to establish liaison, gain information, analyze the situation, and plan a course of action. General Smith and Ambassador Sloan analyzed the Tosk domestic conflict, the Gheg conflict of sovereignty, and the conflict of Yugoslav communist intervention. They then determined the military, political, and economic aid that would be given the governmental functions of Adriatica. It is intended that all this planning be accomplished prior to the arrival of the joint task force if the situation permits.

Phase II, securing the base for operation, was accomplished by the 1st Brigade securing Tirana and Durres. This action paralleled the marines securing government buildings and dock areas in Beirut and the British securing Nairobi in Operation ANVIL. The 1st Brigade deployment maintained the security of Adriatica's government in Tirana and kept Durres, Adriatica's only modern port, available for future use by the Adriatic Joint Task Force. The Gheg capture of Tirana could have resulted in the overthrow of national government

just as the Soviet capture of Budapest overthrew Imre Nagy's government. The security of Tirana and Durres was vital to the success of the Adriatic Joint Task Force and was required by the doctrine.

In phase III, the remainder of the Adriatic Joint Task Force was deployed in accordance with both the doctrine and the prior planning in phase I. The Elbasan Prefecture was politically stable internally and needed only security from the possible Gheg invasion across its northern border. The 2d Brigade was placed in task force reserve near the city of Elbasan because its communication routes provided access to Gheg avenues of attack along the Adriatic coast in the west or along the Shkumbi River valley in the east.

The 3d Brigade was deployed near the city of Berat, the focal point of Tosk civil disturbances. The brigade assumed a show of force role to back up Ambassador Sloan's mediation of the Tosk dispute. Had violence erupted in the southern prefectures, elements of the 3d Brigade would have been committed to a restoration of order role. The brigade would have assisted the government in the function of social regulation by freezing the conflict or by dictation by force. The brigade aided the government by civil action in the function of social progress, but the Adriatica Economic and Social Development Agency carried the brunt of the

responsibilities for this function. The 3d Brigade also aided the government in its function of security by providing military assistance in training new units for the Adriatica Land Army.

By the spring of 1965, the Tosk dispute was politically resolved and the land army had built up its strength to conduct police action in the three northern prefectures. The Communists were identified as the outlaws and not the Gheg tribes as a group. The objectives of the 1965 spring offensive campaign was securing the border approaches between Yugoslavia and Adriatica. The land army was committed to seize these objectives while the joint task force poised to counter any direct Yugoslav military intervention. The seizure of the border approaches, in effect, isolated the Gheg communist element from Yugoslav assistance.

The communist guerrilla campaign was conducted to destroy the communist organization in Adriatica. The joint task forces occupied the northern border of Adriatica and prevented Yugoslav intervention. The mountain redoubts became the bases of communist guerrilla activity. Home guard units were formed to protect the Gheg villages located on the terrain lower than 3,000 feet above sea level. The land army then occupied the terrain above 3,000 feet and carried the battle to the Communists. Food rations and

personnel registration limited the logistical support of the communist guerrillas. The guerrillas were isolated from the Ghegs and forced to fight defensively.

With the ceasing of Yugoslav intervention, the government of Adriatica was able to control all its functions. The Adriatic Joint Task Force had no reason to continue existing and it was dissolved.

The concluded war game has applied the developed doctrine in the desired manner. It appears that the doctrine is well-suited to its purpose of assisting a faltering government.

A leader using the doctrine must be aware of the assumptions discussed in the introduction, and if his general environment does not match the assumptions the doctrine must be modified or discarded.

This doctrine was evolved from employment of division size military forces to assist four historical faltering governments. As new historical examples occur and are studied, the doctrine must be confirmed, or revised as necessary. The doctrine developed by this study is perhaps only a start toward the development of a more pervasive and finite doctrine, but a substantial beginning has been made.

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